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ABSTRACT

This document presents seven articles concerned with governance. Topics include: governance and institutional values; roles and structures for participation in higher education governance; changing governance patterns and the faculty; governance in higher education: authority and conflict in the seventies; collective bargaining; implications for governance; institutes and the university; and the trend toward government financing of higher education through students: can the market model be applied? (MJM)

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Insights into Higher Education: Selected Writings of CSHE, 1969-73

Volume I: Governance

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

Center for the Study of
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The Pennsylvania State University

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Insights into Higher Education: Selected Writings of CSHE, 1969-73

Volume I: Governance

Center for the Study of Higher Education

The Pennsylvania State University
University Park, Pennsylvania
Winter 1974

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Foreword: The Dilemma of Understanding

In their examination of academic institutes and centers, Ikenberry and Friedman refer to those worlds beyond the academic department as the organizational entity best able to "coordinate the talents of several professionals in accomplishing a single task or goal."

From its founding in 1969, the PSU Center for The Study of Higher Education has had one main task or goal—increased understanding of higher education. Its director has said: "Colleges and universities . . . have never been well understood by those who support them, i.e., the larger society. Indeed they are not always well understood by their own constituencies—students, administrators, faculty, or alumni. If they had been understood they might not be under attack."

If this is truly the state of the art, if, as has been suggested, higher education is suffering from crises of confidence (Dressel), breakdowns in belief and loyalty (Clark), and is headed toward becoming, in Kerr's terms, a quasi-public utility, then any attempt to increase understanding of these changes seems a proper concern of the Center. If pressures on higher education are increasingly external, perhaps the answers can be suggested from inside the academy itself. To this end the PSU Center has studied higher education and disseminated its findings in a continuing series of publications—reports, conference papers, and monographs—over its four-year life. A compilation such as this attempts to cull some of the thinking of Center staff on a variety of issues as well as purview one Center's areas of study.

Center personnel and professionals who have contributed papers to Center publications and conferences in the last four years have addressed themselves to several areas where the university is undergoing major shifts. This monograph collects some of their thinking on governance.

The original place and date of publication are indicated at the bottom of the first page of each paper. The papers appear in their original form except for minor editorial changes.

Introduction

Early in 1971 the American Association for Higher Education, with the support of the Keliogg Foundation, sponsored an invitational seminar on restructuring college and university governance. The papers providing the basis for discussion at that seminar were printed in *The Journal of Higher Education* in June 1971.

This seminar is but one manifestation of the current dialogue among scholars and administrators in higher education. Their major question, posed in the opening paper of this volume by G. Lester Anderson, is: Who shall control the university and to what ends?

The current external climate in which this discussion must take place is aptly summarized by Ikenberry in his introductory paper to the seminar:

> The higher education mystique, sustained by the largely uncritical affection of society and by its general lack of understanding and disinterest in the intricacies of higher-education, has given way to a new level of interest, more careful surveillance, increased sophistication, and not infrequent indignation and displeasure.

A year earlier, Ikenberry isolated the need "to build organizational structures equal in complexity to the vast network of physical structures constructed during the sixties" as the central internal challenge to academic governance. This challenge, in turn, depends upon questions of jurisdiction between students, faculty, administrators, trustees, alumni, and university staff, all of whom have some voice in the governance process.

Using the AAUP joint statement on rights and freedom, Ikenberry argues that jurisdictional definition need not and should not be tightly drawn. He also takes exception to the limited jurisdiction that other authorities would approve for the student and suggests that first efforts at restructuring and strengthening the organizational structure might well begin at the departmental level or through multiplication of forums at a lower level.

The need for restructuring university governance grows out of six interrelated phenomena, discussed in Ikenberry's second article in this volume:

1. The decline of the academic mystique.
2. Decline in autonomy.
3. Procedural regularization.
4. Conflict recognition and management.
5. Decentralization.
6. Challenges to professionalism.

This last phenomenon, a consequence of the first five, means that the rights and responsibilities of faculty members—which have enjoyed tremendous growth in the last twenty-five years—must be redefined. For some this redefinition will cause alarm; for others it will be a long-overdue relief.

Kenneth Mortimer analyzes further the six phenomena suggested by Ikenberry. His first article, "Governance in Higher Education: Authority and Conflict in the Seventies," traces four pressures on university governance, external and internal:

1. Increased intervention from the legislative and executive branches of state government.
2. Increasing resort to civil authority in campus crises and disciplinary cases.
3. Trends toward statewide coordination and master planning.
4. Increasing frequency of multicampus systems.

Mortimer suggests, as Ikenberry and Anderson have also suggested, that "External agencies are introducing new constraints on the governance processes of individual institutions . . . [which] are not well understood by practitioners in higher education." He thinks that "The contrast between the shared authority and collective negotiation models is to become one of the crucial governance issues of the seventies." He also notes that "Higher education now faces an era in which

faith in procedures and rules is greater than in the people who administer them and those who are regulated by them." This lack of faith is evident at several places where the collective bargaining model is in operation. Other aspects and implications of collective bargaining for academic governance are discussed in a full-length paper by Mortimer and Lozier.

In the last two papers in this volume, Ikenberry and Friedman draw some interesting conclusions about a new college and university structure, the center or institute, and Leslie rejects what appears to be a new "model" of funding for higher education—the market model of funding through students, promoted by the Carnegie Commission, the Newman Task Force, and the federal government through the Higher Education Amendments of 1972.

Governance and Institutional Values: What is at Stake?*

G. Lester Anderson

The two earlier papers in this report describe analytically a variety of pressures for changes in governance processes and structures in American higher education: pressure for change in the decision-making process; pressure to change the makeup of the parties who make the decisions; (external) pressure for surrender of large segments of the traditional autonomy of colleges and universities. The pertinent question, however, is not always asked: Do the nature and conditions of governance make a difference? Put in more significant terms the question becomes: Who shall control the university and to what ends?

The last great governance shift in American higher education centered at the midpoint of the nineteenth century. During the first half of that century the American college surrendered pietistic aims for utilitarian aims.[1] Control of education by the various religious denominations began to give way to secular control, which permitted the concept of academic freedom to develop, and ultimately to become a major feature of the American system of higher education.[2] During the second half of the nineteenth century the founding of land-grant colleges gave new meaning to the utilitarian aims of higher education, to the general well being of the body politic. The use of the German

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*Originally Part III of CSHE Report No. 12, *Governance and Emerging Values in Higher Education*, September 1971. The other two papers referred to in sentence one are the second Ikenberry paper in this volume and the Mortimer paper also in this volume.

[1]Frederick Rudolph, *The American College and University* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962). See particularly chapters 6-8; 10-11.

[2]Richard Hofstadter and Walter Medsker, *The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955).

model of graduate and professional study to remake Harvard, to found Johns Hopkins, and to enhance and expand the character of the land-grant colleges into universities also had profound effects. The idea that the university should search for "truth" through scholarly activity and research, combined with the German concepts of *Lernfreiheit* and *Lehrfreiheit*[3] enhanced the development of academic freedom.

During the last 125 years this nation has developed an elaborate, exceedingly diverse system of higher education, comprised of more than 2,000 distinct institutions, woven together in common commitments to teaching, research, and service. The commitment of this system to research and intellectual freedom was "made possible by the conditions of an autonomy within the general society to conduct (its) internal affairs without direct intrusion of external forces."[4]

Now this autonomy is being challenged. After more than a century of evolving to autonomy and freedom, we may find ourselves in a struggle similar to that which developed in the nineteenth century. The current challenge, beginning a decade ago, comes from students and other factions, including political orientations of both right and left. The threat is not to the contemporary power group in these institutions, which can withstand power shifts external to it without being fundamentally disturbed; the threat is to the locus of decision making. The power desired is control of the ends and the value system of colleges and universities.

This struggle for power is aptly illustrated by one of the most noted governance issues in the history of American higher education, the University of California oath controversy. Gardner has written:

> There is one grand myth of the loyalty oath conflict, tenaciously clung to by some out of ignorance and by others for ideological reasons, which might be exposed to light at

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[3]The two terms are respectively translated as student freedom to learn and teacher freedom to teach.

[4]E. D. Duryea, "Reform in University Government," *The Journal of Higher Education* 42 (May 1971): 340.

> the outset: that this was mostly a conflict over principles. It was not. In its main outlines and principal events it was a power struggle, a series of personnel encounters between proud and influential men.[5]

Governance issues are varied. They include: efficiency in operation; philosophy of effective organization; ability to impose or maintain organizational discipline; the exercise of authority or power; and, finally, the nature of the goals of the university. Issues of means and of ends may be separately or interdependently involved.

Let us further explore one of the more critical items at issue as governance modes are shifting, namely, institutional goals. There is little doubt that the larger environment is pressing the college and university to change its decision-making processes. Courts, governors, legislators, and trustees are asking faculty and staff to be more accountable, not necessarily in terms of faculty values, but of social values. Internally, powerful forces are at work through the collegial administration, the bureaucracies, and student actions to limit markedly the autonomy which the scholar has had to do his "thing." Not only must he account to students and administrators for the quality of his teaching as he has never before had to account, he must justify his work schedule and his work day. He is being asked by some to give up tenure and by others to surrender personal privilege and individual negotiation in order to protect himself and his peer group through the modes of the labor union—collective bargaining or negotiation.

Who shall tell the scholar what to do? Shall it be the governors, the legislators, the courts, or the community of scholars? What criteria will be used to select or reject faculty activity? Will accountability to *present* social forms, processes, and structures dominate or will the historic role of the scholar-teacher—the creator, conserver, and transmitter of knowledge and culture, as well as the critic of society—be considered?

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[5]David P. Gardner, *The California Oath Controversy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 1.

Part of the situation which colleges and universities face stems from the fact that they have never been well understood by those who support them, i.e., the larger society. Indeed, they are not well understood by their own constituencies—students, alumni, faculty, or administrators. If they had been and were now understood, they might not be under attack. This lack of understanding threatens the potential of colleges and universities to change society, a major responsibility and strength of higher education in the Western world. Because this potential is generally not appreciated or even recognized, the fundamental issue—who makes the decisions—is not perceived in its full significance. It is as teacher and critic of society that the scholar and his organizational home—the college and university—have made their unique contribution to Western culture. It is the shape of Western culture—its openness, ethics, moral values, its tremendous utilization of knowledge to build an affluent society—that are subtly challenged as classical forms of college and university governance are modified. Such subtle challenges may become effective challenges to certain of the historically accepted goals of our university and college systems.

A two-pronged analysis of college and university organization and decision making is beginning to emerge.[6] Arising primarily from

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[6]In the late 1950's the author reviewed and synthesized the literature on college and university organization and administration. At that time it was reported that there was very little research or study based on theoretical or conceptual organizational systems. The literature was pragmatic, topical, descriptive, and often hortatory. [G. Lester Anderson, "Colleges and Universities—Organization and Administration," *Encyclopedia of Educational Research* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 252-268]. It was not until after 1960, when Corson published his book *Governance of Colleges and Universities*, that the term governance began to be freely used regarding the university, and systems of governance began to be analyzed. [John Corson, *Governance of Colleges and Universities*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960)]. In 1963, the author prepared a paper which reviewed the nature of universities in terms of such organizational concepts as community, collegium, and bureaucracy, perhaps the first such analysis and one somewhat primitive in concept. [G. Lester Anderson, "The Organizational Character of American Colleges and Universities," *The Study of Academic Administration* (Boulder, Colorado: WICHE, 1963), pp. 1-19].

the sociological literature are concepts of universities as organizations. Are they bureaucracies? Are they communities? Does it make any difference? From the literature of political theory arise the concepts of processes relevant to decision making. Who has power? Who has authority? Who has influence? Does it make any difference?

It is now clear, however, as a theory of organization emerges, that these modes of organization and operation do make a difference in the functioning of organizations. If bureaucratic forms for university organization grow and prevail, decisions will be made in bureaucratic terms. Efficiency or measures of output will be controlling. Goals will be explicitly set in measurable outputs. Persons skilled in the technologies of management and organizational evaluation will dominate the system. Governing standards will reflect: How many degrees were granted? How many credit hours were generated? How many faculty contact hours by rank were spent in the classroom? How many public lectures were held? How many persons attended? How many pages of scholarly publication were generated by the faculty? Order and efficiency will be controlling concepts.

If community or collegial forms of organization grow and dominate the system, decisions will be made in terms of other criteria. Efficiency will be only an incidental criterion of worth. Values without quantitative counterparts will be held in high esteem.

Today, however, we have a series of studies that apply concepts, derived from sociological and political theory, to college and university organization and administration. Caplow and McGee's the *Academic Market Place*, Millet's *The Academic Community*, Dressel's (et al.) *The Confidence Crisis*, Kruytbosch and Messinger's *The State of the University*, together with Corson's work, are simply illustrative of the attention that has been given in conceptual terms to the college and university organization in the last dozen or so years. This work rests on the fundamental organizational concepts of men like Weber and Parsons, and the more directly applied works of Barnard, Simon, March, Thompson, Blau, Presthus, Gouldner, McGregor, Bennis, Etzioni, Selznick, and many others. This work provides a theoretical base for understanding governance structures and issues. It permits some projection or prediction of the consequences of one or another system.

Questions of the following type when asked and answered will seem to determine the worth of the college or university: How much freedom is present on the campus? What prizewinning books were written? Is the campus congenial to the eccentric? Are students challenging? Are rules flexible and lightly enforced? Do avant-garde or deviant processes or ideas of education find a warm reception?

If one turns to political models for the university or to an identification of decision makers based on concepts of power, authority, and influence, another dimension for evaluation of governance emerges. Do trustees hold the power of decision making, regarding curriculum, requirements for degrees, and teachers? Or do the faculty? Are trustees trustees in the sense of *conservers* of the value system of the college and university? Or do trustees see themselves as significant decision makers in the management affairs of the institution? Do faculty members view themselves as employees, much as school teachers who make decisions within the classroom, but leave the big decisions to administrators and others? Or do faculty members see *themselves as the institution or organization*—as professionals, as determiners of the nature and processes of education and scholarship?

To point out the potential for mischief in changing the goals of higher education in each of the differing mechanisms for governance is perhaps to support the status quo. This is not necessarily so. A process of social adaption for organizations and institutions has characterized all aspects of American higher education—its purpose, its structure, and its operation. Though change is certainly needed today and in the next several decades if the university and the college are to continue their relevance, few are discussing changes in organization and governance in terms of their threat to the purposes of the higher educational institution.

The current discussion must go beyond a defense of the status quo. As courts, governors, legislatures, budget directors, and other public agencies and officials secure power to control the higher educational establishments, it is not enough to deplore the present and defend the past. We must ask: What differences will it make? Do we want these differences? Public bodies want safe institutions. They often do not want the university—its faculty or its students—to be a powerful agent in pointing out the consequences of racism, war, urban

ghettos, or environmental spoilage. But this is what universities are here to be in a socially constructive sense. It is the administrators, faculty, and indeed students and alumni who must become aware of what is happening to governance in terms of its consequences.

It is certain that old modes of governance will not endure without challenge or change. If "tenure" has protected the slothful or the obsolete as well as those who courageously criticize, perhaps new modes for protection of academic freedom will originate. Many faculty members who are established, professional, and satisfied have opposed collective negotiations as a mode of faculty involvement in decision making and a new mode of establishing tenure rights. But it may be that the total academic community in the long view of events will become better served than it has been by present faculty ranking and tenure provisions. It has been pointed out that the "very purpose" of the institution can become negotiable in a collective bargaining process. Hence, if goals are threatened by recent changes in governance, both internal and external, they might well be restored under conditions of collective bargaining. This possibility at least deserves review.

A variety of other relationships could be explored. Who should arbitrate conflict? To what degree should administration be decentralized? What is at issue between statewide coordinating mechanisms and institutional autonomy?

We believe a point has been made. The central theme of this essay purports that the type of governance does make a difference; and, in a most basic sense, it makes a difference in the definition and maintenance of the most fundamental goal of the higher education system—the advancement of knowledge.

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Roles and Structures for Participation in Higher Education Governance: A Rationale*

Stanley O. Ikenberry

It is painfully obvious that the roles for participation of faculty, students, and administrators in campus governance are inadequately defined and that the organizational structure through which these roles might be performed is deficient. Moreover, the rationale on which a modernized structure might be built and new roles defined is grossly underdeveloped. The absence of such a rationale is especially critical at a time of rapid change when it is not only clear that many colleges and universities have outgrown their governance structures, but that new structures and new patterns of relationships will be devised with or without a rationale.

Expansion and growth in institutions of higher learning since World War II have been astronomical. In the main, however, the expansion has been a simple, linear extension of traditional models of organization, curriculum, and architecture—models now inadequate to meet contemporary demands. The familiar models worked reasonably well in an earlier day, for less complex institutions, with faculties in which most members knew each other personally and were engaged in the institution's primary mission, teaching.[1] Perhaps such conditions continue to predominate in some colleges and universities; but for the rapidly expanding two-year college, the emerging university, the multipurpose state college, the now classic multiversity, and others, the model no longer approximates reality.

It is important to understand the magnitude of the task. Burton Clark states the case well when he writes:

> One is tempted to say of the gigantic campus of the near future that there will be no society there. It becomes clearer each year that if there is to be a society there, it must be

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*Originally CSHE Report No. 5, August 1970.

[1]William K. Selden, "Some Observations on the Governance of the American University," *The Teachers College Board* 68 (January 1967): 277-88.

> continuously planned for and worked at. For a long time we have been able to depend on an emergent unplanned social structure--personal ties generated by students and faculty--to infuse academic campgrounds with saving elements of human caring. But now no longer: Students and faculty will occasionally generate a humane social structure in a massive educational enterprise, but we can less and less depend on it. Growth is too fast, specialization is too fragmenting, economic logics of efficient manpower processing are too much in command. The crucial aspect of reform in American higher education is to devise substructures on the large campus that promote informal influence and a sense of personal contact instead of substructures that build walls of impersonality and formal (and seemingly arbitrary) authority.[2]

The challenge of the seventies is to build organizational structures for communication, decision making, and human relationships equal in complexity to the vast network of physical structures constructed during the sixties. The remainder of this paper will consider the rationale for such faculty and student organizations in higher education and examine four issues which may need to be confronted in an attempt to modernize the faculty-student-administration organizational structure.

Institutions of Higher Learning as Organizations

Recasting the structure of colleges and universities and suggesting new roles for faculty and student organizations requires understanding of the peculiarities of institutions of higher learning as organizations. Indeed, it is precisely this lack of understanding which causes student, faculty, and administrative groups alike to grab for power at inappropriate places and to become disillusioned and frustrated when they find that the power they sought and thought they had never existed.

Etzioni suggests two broad classes of organizations: production and professional.[3] By far the most common of the two is the

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[2]Burton R. Clark, "The New University," *The American Behavioral Scientist* 11 (May-June 1968): 4.

[3]Amitai Etzioni, *Modern Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

production-oriented organization such as a factory, a business, or the military. In such organizations it is generally possible to establish organizational goals and the policies and procedures to be followed in the achievement of those goals at the upper levels of the hierarchy of the organization. These can be interpreted and reinterpreted, being made more specific at each successive level, until the lowest levels of the organization are included.

Such a model is not equally applicable to a hospital, a research and development laboratory, a school, a college, or a complex university. The difficulty encountered is that the hierarchy of a professional organization is restricted in its ability, that is to say its technical competence, to specify the procedures to be followed in the performance of the organization's mission. This technical limitation stems not only from the complexity of the task to be performed, but from the inability to predict the specific nature of the task in a given instance. It is for precisely this reason that it is necessary for such organizations to employ professionals rather than skilled craftsmen. It is also because of these technical limitations that there tend to be multiple lines of power and influence and an atypical reliance on professional staff in the determination of means, ends, and standards of performance.

Thus, in institutions of higher learning the authority of the hierarchy tends to be restricted. Even if the contemporary college president had the ultimate in full, unrestricted authority, he and his subordinates and their subordinates would find it difficult to *order* excellence. Consequently, the academy tends to rely on open communication and peer consensus, with mixed and unclear jurisdiction among administrators, faculty, and students.[4] Substituted for the hierarchy of the production-oriented organization must be a clear understanding of the mission of the institution and a shared sense of common values and standards by professionals and emerging professionals.

A recent report of the Study Commission on University Governance at Berkeley, however, admits that "The melancholy truth is

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[4]Terry F. Lunsford, "Authority and Ideology in the Administered University," *The American Behavioral Scientist* 11 (May-June 1968): 5-13.

there is no widely shared understanding about the meaning and purpose of the institution. Lacking the unifying force which flows spontaneously from common understanding, the system is held together by a bureaucratic organization whose weakness is exposed whenever it is directly challenged."[5] Specifically, the higher education organizational structures of the past no longer appear effective in building shared purpose and values, the ideology essential to the effective functioning of institutions of higher learning. It is precisely at this point that effective faculty-student-administrative organizations become not only desirable, but perhaps essential in reestablishing meaning and purpose in American higher education.

C. Michael Otten provides an interesting view of the past when he describes the administration of Benjamin Ide Wheeler, president of the University of California more than a half-century ago. "Loyalty" to the university was strong, a kind of family loyalty. Wheeler is said to have played the role of father and frequently addressed the student body as his children. "Loyalty was not just an emotional byproduct of a gathered group of undergraduates; it was consciously defined, carefully nurtured, and deliberately sustained by Wheeler himself."[6] The loyalty at California was strong but not atypical of that which might have been found on many college campuses up through World War II. It not only bound the campus together with a common sense of meaning and purpose, it remained strong following graduation and formed the foundation for strong alumni loyalties which many institutions continue to enjoy.

The campus of fifty years ago, however, has changed. The force of tradition has weakened, goals and values are more diffused, and the backgrounds and lifestyles of the participants are less homogeneous. Such changes are felt not only in institutions of higher learning, but in all aspects of contemporary society.[7] Diversity, pluralism,

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[5]"The Culture of the University: Governance and Education," (Report of the Study Commission on University Governance, University of California, Berkeley, California, January 15, 1968, pp. 7-8).

[6]C. Michael Otten, "Ruling Out Paternalism: Students and Administrators at Berkeley," *The American Behavioral Scientist* 11 (May-June 1968): 28.

[7]Logan Wilson, "Changing University Governance," *Educational Record* 50 (Fall 1969): 388-404.

moderation, compromise, and the mediation rather than supression of conflict dominate. Such values place institutions of higher learning in a vulnerable position; they do not evoke strong loyalties, they are difficult to defend, they do not suggest priorities or courses of action, and they leave the institution open to poorly reasoned demands for irresponsible and radical change.[8] The great danger of this deficiency is not only the confusion and conflict frequently quite obvious, nor the reduced effectiveness implied, but the invited threat to the very freedom essential to maintain colleges and universities as functioning professional organizations.

The burden of these organizational and structural deficiencies is frequently taken on by administrators, compelled to become specialists in creating and spreading official ideologies for many of the same reasons President Wheeler did so fifty years ago. But the nature of higher education and the nature of society no longer enable a similar measure of success. Administrators will continue to be indispensible in this regard, but the burden may no longer be carried by the administration alone. Nor indeed was the burden carried alone by Wheeler. The business of building an ideology, a cohesive sense of organizational purpose, must be carried by all.

The organizational structure and substructure of today's college or university must be refashioned to enable faculty and students, as well as administrators, to shape, to interpret, and to communicate the ideology of the institution. It is in this sense that faculty and student organizations are both indispensable and underdeveloped in nearly every college and university in the land.

The Organization Debate

Several issues frequently emerge in the organization debate. Certainly among the more common of the points of discussion is the question of jurisdictions: who shall be concerned with which issues? It is on these questions that the lack of understanding of colleges and

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[8]Martin Trow, "Conceptions of the University: The Case of Berkeley," *The American Behavioral Scientist* 11 (May-June 1968): 14-27.

universities as organizations is most clearly apparent. In a fine Weberian sense, some want to allocate certain areas of responsibility to students, certain matters to faculty, and reserve other decisions exclusively for the administration.

Kerlinger illustrates this point of view when he suggests that "Educational policy making is, or should be, a faculty function. Only the faculty of the university is qualified to decide the structure and content of courses of instruction, instructional programs and curricula, and means and methods of teaching."[9] Using concepts of legitimacy, competence, and responsibility, Kerlinger suggests that students should participate in decision making in areas such as student discipline, living conditions, student publications, and social affairs. "Matters of actual educational moment, on the other hand are not appropriate for student decision making."[10] Sidney Hook sets forth a similar view and one not at all uncommon among many college faculties.[11]

But such suggestions ignore the special nature of institutions of higher learning as organizations. Such careful designation of functions, such precise divisions of labor, are neither conceptually sound nor practically viable. The AAUP Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students suggests that "As constituents of the academic community, students should be free, individually and collectively, to express their views on issues of institutional policy and on matters of general interest to the student body. The student body should have clearly defined means to participate in the formulation and application of institutional policy affecting academic and student affairs."[12]

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[9]Fred N. Kerlinger, "Student Participation in University Educational Decision Making," *The Teachers College Record* 70 (October 1968): 45.

[10]*Ibid.*, p. 45.

[11]Sidney Hook, "The Architecture of Educational Chaos," *Phi Delta Kappan* 51 (October 1969): 68-70.

[12]"Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students," *AAUP Bulletin* 54 (June 1968): 260.

As in few other organizations, it is essential that all members of the academic enterprise help shape and enhance the ideology, the purpose and functioning of the institution. Separation of the institution into segments, educational versus noneducational, or academic concerns versus student concerns, ignores reality. The decision whether or not to build a gymnasium, as Columbia found out, is not always as unambiguous as it might appear. Accordingly, on the issue of jurisdictions, the rationale set forth argues against rigid jurisdictional definitions and for openness of communications. A regular rather than an improvised *ad hoc* structure is needed for such discussions to take place.

A second issue frequently encountered in the organization debate is that of autonomy of authority versus shared influence. No veteran of academic government has failed to sit on the typical committee which spends the first full year of deliberations attempting to insure its autonomy and authority against every possible contingency. The familiar debate suggests that if anybody at any level can in any manner overrule or modify the recommendations of the committee or organization, its deliberations are of no avail and adjournment is in order. Non-negotiable student demands and the tactics of authoritarian administrators are of the same inappropriate order.

The demand for absolute authority ignores the fact that no group—trustees, administrators, faculty, or students—can or should lay claim to absolute control.[13] The concept of shared authority and responsibility is more appropriate, both to the faculty, to the student, and to administrative groups in shaping the ideologies and value systems which will guide institutional decisions and performance. Again, the AAUP statement emphasizes that the essential and overriding principle is that the enterprise is joint, and that there must be adequate communication among all components with a full opportunity for appropriate joint planning and effort. Unmonitored authority is destructive in the academic enterprise, whether it originates from trustees, students, administrators, or faculty.

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[13]Logan Wilson, "Changing University Governance," p. 402.

A third element of the organization debate frequently revolves around the question of centralization versus decentralization. If one were to assume a strong emphasis on the hierarchy of command, the logical point for acquisition of authority, power, and influence is at the top of the organization. The recent rush of students into the upper levels of the hierarchy of colleges and universities as members of governing boards, faculty senates, presidential executive councils, and the like suggests the inappropriate assumption that power, authority, and influence rest at the "top" in colleges and universities. That there is a heirarchy in institutions of higher learning is obvious; that many crucial decisions, such as the initial allocation of resources, are made at the upper levels is also apparent; but that the upper levels of the hierarchy are the most effective points of participation for those students and faculty who wish to influence the course of colleges and universities is open to much debate.

W. Donald Bowles is strong on this point when he writes "The road to student power is littered with the dead remains of grandiose 'all-university' schemes for approaching 'the major university issues. In a very real sense there are no university issues, only departmental issues."[14] John Millett states "emphatically and unequivocally that the basic mission of a university in our society is professional education, the educational preparation of youth of appropriate talent to staff the professions of our society."[15] In both instances, there is the clear suggestion that the ability to influence the nature of one's environment in the academy begins in the individual classroom and at the departmental level.

The Berkeley report on university governance suggests that what is needed is not an improved and more powerful central forum for the expression of faculty and student interests, but a multiplication of forums at lower levels. The report discusses senates at the level of colleges, schools, and departments where issues are more comprehensible, more manageable, and more likely to evoke participation of those vitally concerned.

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[14]W. Donald Bowles, "Student Participation in Academic Governance," *Educational Record* 49 (Summer 1968): 259.

[15]John D. Millett, "Value Patterns and Power Conflict in American Higher Education," *Value Change and Power Conflict*, eds., W. John Minter and Patricia O. Snyder (Boulder, Colorado: WICHE, 1969), p. 4.

McLendon of NYU observes that although appointments and promotions may indeed be formally made by the board of trustees, they originate and tend to be determined at the departmental level. For this reason, he suggests: "If students are going to be heard from in the process of decisions concerning tenure of professors . . . they must be heard from at the place where the decisions are determined: within the university departments."[16] In reconstituting the governance structure of institutions of higher learning, the attention currently directed toward the upper levels of the hierarchy might better be placed at the more basic levels—the course, program, or department.

At the heart of the matter is the ability of higher education to deal with conflicting points of view. Myth has it that colleges and universities are the home of the unorthodox, a safe haven for independent thought, a forum for the debate of competing points of view. In fact, most institutions of higher learning have been just the opposite. Few social institutions or organizations in our society screen their membership as carefully as do colleges and universities. Special purpose institutions such as church-related colleges, professional schools, teachers colleges and others have been established, in part, to insure even greater uniformity in goals and values. Accreditation societies, legislative bodies, and professional associations push toward conformity. In fact, colleges and universities are not well designed to accommodate conflict. It is the press toward general uniformity in goals and values, not the trend toward diversity or plurality, that has marked higher education institutions over the last half century.

Frick made this observation when he reported that "participants in the enterprise of higher education must understand that hostility, conflict, anxiety, guilt and defensiveness are generated within the college community. . . . It is obvious that there are many conflicts both within the faculty and between the faculty and others. These tend, for the most part, to be swept under the rug, suppressed."[17]

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[16]Hiram J. McLendon, "In Search of New Centers of Authority," *New York University Education Quarterly* 1 (Winter 1970): 6.

[17]Ivan E. Frick, "Reflections on Participatory Democracy," *Liberal Education* 55 (May 1969): 268-69.

In short, the typical conflict resolution mechanism in institutions of higher learning has been to deny the existence of conflict or to avoid conflict through inaction. When conflict becomes open and obvious, institutions of higher learning find it difficult to manage.

As an alternative, it might be more appropriate to recognize that there are from time to time very legitimate points of conflict between the interests and concerns of professors and those of students, between administrators and faculty, as well as conflicts within the membership of these various groups. Is the currently popular organizational practice of placing students on faculty committees, on senates, and on governing boards, usually in minority roles, the most effective fashion of identifying and facing honest differences among various interest groups? Is it yet another attempt to gloss over or suppress these differences through co-optation? If institutions of higher learning are, in fact, to fulfill their role as a haven for the unorthodox, the structure must accommodate it.

Summary

It is a cruel paradox to find that colleges and universities are of unequaled importance to both the individual and to society, while many institutions are unsure of purpose, bewildered by conflict, and ready to recall the freedom of the academy in favor of certainty and order. One of the problems is that institutions of higher learning have outgrown their organizational structure. The simplistic faculty, student, and administrative organizational patterns of the past were designed for an earlier day, for a different social institution, in a radically different context.

The nature of colleges and universities as complex organizations is not well understood, either within the confines of the campus or beyond. The special qualities of the organization demand an understanding of purpose and ideology by all concerned, regardless of position in the hierarchy. This condition is not met on most campuses and, consequently, colleges and universities are vulnerable to attack both from within and by external forces as well.

One crucial task is the reform of the substructures of the American campus in such a way as to promote greater influence and

personal contact by a great variety of individuals and groups. Recasting and strengthening student-faculty-administrative organizations is essential.

Jurisdictional definitions need not and should not be tightly drawn. Demands for complete autonomy of authority, whether issued by students, faculty, or administrators, should be treated as lightly as they are made. Because of the nature of institutions of higher learning as complex organizations, first efforts at restructuring and strengthening the organizational structure might well begin at the departmental level rather than with senates and boards of trustees. The eventual aim should be to enable institutions of higher learning to be the centers of free inquiry and the havens of divergent and unorthodox thought they have so long professed to be.

Changing Governance Patterns and the Faculty*

Stanley O. Ikenberry

Those in higher education are fond of referring to each year or decade as one of unprecedented challenge and demand for new dedication and adaptation by colleges and universities. If such language was appropriate in the past, it somehow rings as an understatement as colleges and universities move into the decade of the seventies. Uncertainty, conflict, confusion, lack of trust, and challenges to many cherished traditions in American higher education suggest no mere pruning of a few overextended branches, but that more fundamental challenges reaching to the very taproot of American higher education are in motion.[1]

Much of the turmoil on college campuses in the last half-dozen years has focused on issues of governance, or the decision-making process. The struggle has centered on questions such as: Who should participate in decision making? What are the issues? Whose procedures should be followed to resolve disputes and what structures are appropriate? Whose values and interests are to be promoted?

Answers to at least some of these questions are beginning to emerge on most campuses and, through the smoke and debris, the trends may suggest some hint of the future. The aim of this paper is to enumerate a few of these apparent trends and to speculate on certain implications for the future.

I. The Demise of the Academic Mystique

Perhaps the most pervasive trend in higher education governance is best termed a demise of the academic mystique.[2] The breakdown in governance systems on many college and university campuses

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[1]Clark Kerr, "Destiny—Not So Manifest," *New Teaching, New Learning*, ed. G. Kerry Smith (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971), pp. 245-52.

[2]For a more detailed elaboration and documentation of the trends that follow, see *The Journal of Higher Education* 42 (June

during the sixties and the consequent confidence crises that emerged opened colleges and universities to new levels of scrutiny from those within as well as those without. Lack of trust and suspicion forced institutions to open their decision-making processes to greater public inspection. As examples, decisions regarding the award of tenure at Yale and elsewhere required greater disclosure and public justification. Faculty salaries and ranks at Michigan and throughout the land were subjected to careful examination to insure the absence of discrimination against women. Decisions regarding the allocation of the institution's resources and the management of its investments, as well as the implied values and priorities, frequently required open defense both within the institution and to the public at large.

The higher education mystique of the past, sustained by a largely uncritical affection and by a general disinterest and lack of understanding of the intricacies of college and university decision making, gave way to new levels of campus involvement, more careful public surveillance, and increased sophistication in all quarters. Assuming this new exposure of colleges and universities is not likely to be quickly reversed, institutions must accommodate new demands for accountability, from new constituencies, and in more precise forms than in the past.

II. Decline in Autonomy

A second governance trend has been a general decline in autonomy for nearly all in the campus community: administrators, faculty members, students, and trustees. College presidents, for example, now recognize the need to retain the confidence and support of students, faculty, alumni, legislators, donors, coordinating boards, trustees, and the general public. This dependence has placed genuine limitations on presidential autonomy.

Faculty autonomy is very clearly in a period of decline at many institutions, particularly at universities, not only as a result of a reassertion of administrative authority, but as a consequence of legislative

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1971): 421-544, which presents a series of six analytical papers, accompanied by commentary. Analysts include John J. Corson, Burton R. Clark, T. R. McConnell, Kenneth P. Mortimer, Talcott Parsons, and Marvin W. Peterson.

intervention. Students have stepped up their surveillance of faculty members through more systematic evaluation of teaching and increased membership on campus committees. Students themselves, however, enjoy less autonomy. Increased intervention by civil authorities has at least partially filled the vacuum created by the withdrawal of colleges and universities from *in loco parentis* policies. Although students have greater influence in the governance process, especially in the exercise of their rights as consumers, the record of campus unrest in 1970-71 suggests that small groups of students are now less likely to paralyze a campus and enforce their demands on other segments of the academic community.

Decisions by college trustees, often considered beyond review, are now given increased scrutiny. Indeed, even the legitimacy of the board and the appropriateness of its membership has been called into question.[3]

In short, several forces now challenge individual and institutional autonomy, long regarded as an essential feature of American higher education, and there is little evidence to suggest an early reversal of the trend. Accommodation to this more restricted and inhibited state will not come easily to any of the segments of the academic community, but the most severe adjustment problems may be experienced by faculty members.

III. Procedural Regularization

A third trend of note is an increased standardization of governance procedures and codes. The loosely organized *ad hoc* traditions of academic organization have given way on many college and university campuses to greater standardization and formalization of governance procedures. Campus-wide and community-wide councils and assemblies, for example, have been established at several institutions and replace previously informal and irregular consultations among faculty, students, administrators, and governing boards. Codes of conduct for students, faculty members, and administrators have been made

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[3]Rodney T. Hartnett, *The New College Trustee: Some Predictions for the 1970s* (Princeton, New Jersey: Educational Testing Service, 1970), p. 44.

more explicit, and procedures for appeal of grievances and enforcement of the codes have been strengthened on many campuses. The student code at one state university, for example, previously required students to conduct themselves as ladies and gentlemen, a definition since found to be wanting in terms of specificity. Standardization of procedures has also been brought about on some campuses by the emergence of unions. Formerly undefined and irregular salary schedules and promotion policies have been standardized and made explicit as a result of collective bargaining. Previously informal procedures, mores, and standards have been subjected to negotiation and incorporated as part of the formal contract.

Regardless of the specific form, colleges and universities have been forced to reject the *ad hoc*, informal approaches to governance of the past in favor of more stable, elaborate, and well-defined mechanisms. While such moves may help to manage and reduce campus conflict, they may also restrict institutional flexibility and adaptation.

IV. Conflict Recognition and Management

A fourth trend relates to a growing acceptance of the possibility of campus conflict as the norm rather than the exception. The college campus has grown too pluralistic, the politics of confrontation have become too powerful, and the social cement of consensus has weakened to the extent that it is no longer possible to ignore the prospect of conflict. On most college campuses, as well as in society at large, the question is not whether there will be conflict, but whether there is an adequate mechanism for its identification and management.

Clark Kerr, speaking at a recent Houston conference on governance, suggested that an academic model of the future may resemble more closely that of a quasi-public utility in the sense that it would acknowledge conflict among the interests of students, faculty, administrators, and others within the academic community, as well as points of conflict between the needs of institutions and the public interest. The important implication is the legitimation of conflict in higher education, and with its legitimation, the need for strengthening higher education's capacity for conflict management and resolution.

V. Decentralization

A fifth apparent trend in higher education governance relates to decentralization. The Newman Report is only the most recent to call for greater decentralization.[4] The hope is somehow to change the campus in the direction of more unified belief clusters, to increase diversity among these clusters, and reduce the tension among factions through organizational insulation and decentralization.

Advocates of greater decentralization point out that colleges and universities depend heavily on voluntary compliance and that the preservation of the traditional freedoms of the academic environment requires a workable consensus about means, ends, and basic value assumptions. The present weaknesses in the bonds between institutional belief and purpose are only too apparent in most large, complex institutions.[5]

The problems of decentralization are several, however, and include the unrelenting pressures, external as well as internal, for increased accountability. Decentralization may mean greater risk taking and less apparent accountability, and therefore colleges and universities are likely to proceed cautiously. An additional and perhaps more significant obstacle to decentralization is the inability of the present organizational structure of colleges and universities to lend itself to decentralization. One of the major problems faced by many institutions over the last decade has been that of dealing with the consequences of unintended decentralization; greater decentralization along these same lines would only exacerbate an already severe problem. Failure to decentralize, on the other hand, may restrict both the governance stability and the educational effectiveness of institutions of higher learning.

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[4]Frank Newman, chairman, *Report on Higher Education*, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, March 1971), pp. 71-72.

[5]Burton R. Clark, "The New University," *The State of The University*, eds., Carlos E. Kruytbosch and Sheldon L. Messinger (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970), pp. 17-26.

VI. A Challenge to Professionalism

An additional trend is found in the growing challenges to academic professionalism, which take several forms. The restriction of faculty autonomy and formalization of procedures, for example, run counter to traditions of professional autonomy, application of professional judgment, and adherence to professional rather than organizational values and procedures. Demands for more explicit statements of ethics and more direct response to instances of apparently irresponsible faculty behavior illustrate the challenge to traditional professionalism and to the assumption that professionals can and will govern themselves.

The challenge to academic professionalism has confronted the general public from still different directions. The Free Speech Movement at Berkeley, and the disruptions at Columbia and Harvard, the bombings at Wisconsin, and the general unrest on most of America's supposedly "best" campuses caused the traditional models of academic excellence, toward which much of American higher education had aspired, to turn sour.

Emphasis on graduate education, occasionally considered by some to be nearly synonymous with institutional excellence, came under fire as the demand for Ph.D.s entered a period of decline while the production of graduates reached an all time high.[6] Research activity, earlier seen as a sign of academic status and institutional prestige, became the focus of intense criticism by those who demanded that higher priorities be given to teaching and more time and attention devoted to students.

Whether challenges to academic professionalism are of a short-run, crisis-related duration, or whether they suggest a more fundamental long-term redefinition of academic values is not clear. It is apparent, however, that an academic counterrevolution is underway, which will inhibit, if not reverse, the trends toward increased academic professionalization, so strong and apparent in the decade of the sixties. A

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[6] Allan M. Cartter, "Aftereffects of Blind Eye to Telescope," *Educational Record* 51 (Fall 1970): 333-38.

broader, more comprehensive infusion of "public interest" values is likely to be interjected as the base on which college and university decisions will be made during the seventies.

VII. Implications for Members of the Faculty

The history of higher education is one of change, of institutional adaptation in a changing society. The decade of the seventies clearly marks a significant point for American colleges and universities, perhaps without parallel during this century. Clark Kerr observed that "Higher education in the United States is entering a great climacteric—a period of uncertainty, of conflict, of confusion, of potential change."[7] The noted governance trends, suggestive of much broader changes taking place in institutions of higher learning, carry potentially far-reaching implications for institutional structure, mission, programs, and finance, as well as higher education's role within the broader society. A brief analysis of the special implications of changing governance patterns for faculty members may therefore be timely.

First, *faculty members will continue to seek and to receive a significant role in institutional policy formation and decision making, but will be confronted with difficult and far-reaching choices about the means of participation.* The debate over whether faculty should share the power is no longer at issue; the more significant questions revolve around the areas or issues most appropriate for heavy faculty involvement, the levels within and beyond the institution at which the involvement should take place, and, perhaps most important, the *means* through which faculty members will be involved in policy formation and decision making. Speaking for the community colleges in this regard, Richard Richardson suggested his concern by observing that "the question today is no longer one of whether faculty will be involved but rather the more serious issue of what the role the administrator is likely to be, should the current trend in the direction of separate faculty organizations for the purpose of negotiating salary and working conditions continue."[8]

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[7]Clark Kerr, "Destiny—Not So Manifest," p. 252.

[8]Richard C. Richardson, Jr., "Needed: New Directions in Administration," *Junior College Journal* 40 (March 1970): 16.

Whether faculty will press for more active participation in academic and institutional policy decisions through the more conventional route of senates, faculty committees, and assemblies or whether they will place primacy on collective bargaining and negotiations as a principal means of participation is not clear, and the answer will differ among types of institutions. In the case of two-year colleges, faculty choice has moved heavily in the direction of collective bargaining. The comparative weakness of traditional mechanisms and traditions of faculty participation in decision making in two-year colleges presents collective bargaining as an attractive alternative to some faculty members interested not only in potential salary advantages but in securing a stronger role and voice in the institutional governance processes.

Movement toward collective negotiations, however, has been much more reserved at four-year institutions and complex universities. One might hypothesize from early evidence that those institutions in which the values and traditions of academic professionalism are the strongest will be most likely to retain the more traditional forms of faculty participation. Whatever the choice by faculty among principal means of participation in campus decision making, the choice will have far-reaching consequences and will influence not only the nature and degree of faculty participation in governance but the very character of colleges and universities themselves.

Second, *faculty members will be forced to share several of their traditional decision-making prerogatives with others, likely at some sacrifice to present assumptions about professional autonomy and academic freedom.* Although faculty members will maintain a significant voice in policy formation and decision making, by whatever means, they will also need to share many of their traditional decision-making prerogatives with others. Students, of course, have been invited—or barring an invitation have invaded—institutional committees, councils, and assemblies, formerly reserved for faculty and administrative participation. The sanctity of the classroom will be influenced by the growing practices of systematic student evaluation of teaching and the increased opportunity for student appeal of grievances. Students will share the power,[9] and some of the power will be shared in areas formerly reserved almost solely for faculty judgment.

[9]Earl J. McGrath, *Should Students Share the Power? A Study of Their Role in College and University Governance* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1970).

Faculty members will also need to accommodate themselves to stronger administrative initiatives. Lewis Mayhew has observed that restoration of power to the presidency of American colleges and universities may not be an altogether complete remedy to the several ills that confront higher education, but stronger central leadership may be an essential precondition to any more permanent solutions.[10] Shifts in public opinion, changes in the supply and demand ratio between available Ph.D.s and academic openings in universities, public expectations for stronger institutional (administrative) accountability, as well as the serious internal and external threats to the very survival of several institutions will call forth the demand for much stronger administrative initiative in the years immediately ahead.

Not only will faculty members need to accommodate themselves to apparent encroachments from administrators and students, faculty members in institutions supported from public funds—which more and more includes nearly all of higher education—will need to adjust to increasingly powerful external forces, which will influence decisions traditionally reserved to the faculty. Palola, Lehmann, and Blischke have observed that statewide coordinating bodies have been reasonably effective in controlling the expansion of new educational thrusts, stimulating and reviewing institutional long-range planning, defining and approving new needs and priorities to be served by higher education, and defining and defending the dimensions of institutional differentiation in mission within broader, complex systems of higher education.[11] Although some have called attention to the dangers of excessive centralization of control in public higher education,[12] there is no impressive evidence suggesting a reversal of the trends toward increased central scrutiny of institutional goals and objectives, programs, and priorities.

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[10]Lewis B. Mayhew, "Emerging Concepts of the Presidency," *The Journal of Higher Education* 42 (May 1971): 366.

[11]Ernest G. Palola, Timothy Lehmann, and William R. Blischke, *Higher Education by Design: The Sociology of Planning* (Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1970).

[12]Newman, *Report on Higher Education*, p. 72.

In short, whether from forces within the institution resulting from a shift in the institutional balance of power or whether from growing forces external to the institution such as statewide coordinating agencies and central governing boards, faculty members will likely be required to share several of their traditional decision-making prerogatives with others. The adaptation, in turn, will probably be made at some sacrifice to the usual assumptions about professional autonomy and accepted mores of academic freedom. Indeed, the redefinition of these fundamental concepts may turn out to be the most important items on the academic agenda in the seventies.

Third, *if faculty members wish to maximize their participation in governance and sustain the traditions and expectations for faculty exercise of professional judgment in institutional decisions, they will need to satisfy college administrators, boards of trustees, students, and the public at large that professional values are not necessarily at variance with the values of the broader society.* One of the most significant challenges facing higher education during the 1970s is the restoration of public confidence. The so-called confidence crisis is characterized by a decline in public trust in the ability of academic administrators and faculty members to cope successfully with the contemporary problems in higher education and to be sufficiently responsive to societal interpretations of the public interest. Newspaper and television accounts of student unrest during the late sixties and early seventies suggested an image of college and university faculty members ranging from that of benign neglect and general ineptitude to outright complicity. Questions of misplaced institutional priorities on teaching, research, and public service were directed not only to members of the administration and boards of trustees, but to the faculty as well. Public attitudes were further inflamed by misinterpretations of the traditions of academic freedom and tenure that seemed to place irresponsible faculty members beyond the reach of professional accountability. Contributing further to the deterioration of public confidence has been the paradox of astronomically high tuition costs in private higher education and staggering legislative budget strains in the public sector, while at the same time large numbers of institutions are apparently facing immediate or prospective financial crises.[13]

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[13]Earl F. Cheit, *The New Depression in Higher Education, A Study of Financial Conditions in 41 Colleges and Universities* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971).

These concerns happened to coincide with a point in time at which faculty power in academic decision making was at an all-time high, and thus it is not surprising that faculty members have been placed in a vulnerable position. If the faculty wishes to maximize its participation in decision making in the future and to sustain the traditions that have allowed the exercise of independent professional judgment, it will need to seek ways to insure the interjection and strengthening of the public interest in academic decision making. Moreover, faculty members must recognize the fact that conflicts between professional values and the public interest can and do arise and that the two are not necessarily synonymous as was apparently assumed during the decade of the sixties.

Fourth, *faculty members will need to be prepared to accept closer and more careful review of their performance and to respond to demands for greater professional as well as institutional accountability.* The academic profession at large, particularly the American Association of University Professors, was shocked by the action of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities which withdrew endorsement from the 1940 AAUP Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure. In withdrawing its endorsement, the Association approved a new statement which contained essentially the same language but added new sections on faculty responsibilities. Parallel to such moves have been efforts by several institutions including Stanford, the University of California, and others to strengthen institutional definitions of faculty responsibilities and establish procedures and mechanisms for their enforcement.

The probability of more careful review of faculty performance is also suggested by growing legislative encroachments in Michigan, New York, and other states that have defined, by law, academic work loads, adjusted sabbatical leave policies, and taken other actions in apparent attempts to force faculty members as well as institutions to respond more directly to the public interest as defined, in these cases, by state legislatures. At the same time, of course, faculty members will have opened more direct routes for appeal of their grievances. Arbitrary board and administrative actions, for example, including the dismissal of junior faculty members without reported cause, will also come under more general scrutiny. Such practices may enforce greater degrees of

institutional accountability to faculty members. Regularization of faculty salary and promotion criteria and more systematic evaluation of faculty performance from a variety of sources will, on the one hand, provide greater scrutiny of faculty performance, but on the other hand, it may enable faculty members to avoid sometimes alleged discriminatory and irrational institutional personnel policies.

Thus, demands for accountability are likely to be made across the board. Such demands may require closer and more careful review of faculty performance, but they may also demand greater scrutiny of the relationships between faculty members and their institutions.

After what many would assess to be one of the most comprehensive recent reviews of governance shifts in American higher education now available, T. R. McConnell concluded that "The most unchallengeable thing that can be said about the present pattern of authority, power, and influence in American higher education is that it is in flux. I do not know what configuration will emerge in the next decade. I am not even sure what pattern I think should emerge. But surely there will be a continuing struggle for power, and the contenders will be numerous."[14] In short, the only certainty may be the rather clear expectation of continuing change.

One might summarize the net effect of recent governance trends in the observation that faculty members will need to adapt to new institutional structures, different governance systems, unfamiliar procedures, and new mores if they wish to keep abreast of changing governance patterns. Younger members of the faculty may find these changes most comfortable and comprehensible; but for many senior members of the faculty, not only will new structures, procedures, and mores need to be learned, but old patterns, conceptions, and traditions will have to be unlearned or broken.

A continuous challenge, reform, and reaffirmation of the purposes of higher education is essential if colleges and universities are to remain viable social institutions and to play an optimum role in Ameri-

[14] T. R. McConnell, *The Redistribution of Power in Higher Education* (Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1971), pp. 1-2.

can society. The struggle over college and university governance is no less than a struggle to control this relationship. Much of the institutional adaptation and change will be brought about by externally generated pressures; much will be brought about through effective administrative leadership. Still, much of the change—and perhaps the most significant of the change—must come about through the energies and talents of faculty members. How this will be accomplished and the ultimate social benefits remain enticing and unanswered questions.

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Governance in Higher Education: Authority and Conflict in the Seventies*

Kenneth P. Mortimer

The current governance milieu for institutions of higher education may be characterized as being in a state of flux. A variety of external pressures, many of them of fairly recent origin, are forcing new governance relationships on colleges and universities, while at the same time internal constituencies are demanding an increased role in governance. It is not yet certain whether external or internal forces will have the greater long-run impact on higher education. Many of the basic questions of governance in the seventies will be answered by the accommodations made between these external and internal forces.

I. Challenges to Traditional Authority Relationships

A. External Authority. The challenges to traditional institutional authority relationships from external sources take four major forms: governmental intervention, judicial rulings, statewide coordination and planning, and multicampus systems.[1] O'Neil has argued that external forces constitute a greater threat to institutional or faculty autonomy than the intrinsic limitations on internal self-government.[2] It is certain that external agencies are introducing new constraints on the governance processes of individual institutions and that these constraints are not well understood by practitioners in higher education.

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[1]There are many external agencies which have been exerting considerable influence over colleges and universities for decades. These include accrediting agencies, professional societies, the federal government, and churches. The reference here is to some more recent incursions into institutional autonomy.

[2]Robert O'Neil, "The Eclipse of Faculty Autonomy" (Paper delivered at a national conference on Faculty Members and Campus Governance, Houston, February 18, 1971).

One rather obvious challenge to traditional institutional governance patterns is increasing intervention from the legislative and executive branches of state government. In its 1970 session, the California State Legislature granted 5 percent cost of living pay raises to all state employees except faculty members of the University of California and the California State College systems. Though this was not necessarily a punitive or disciplinary action, public colleges and universities are continually being reminded of their dependence on legislative appropriations. The Pennsylvania State Legislature failed to appropriate funds for the operation of The Pennsylvania State University until midway through the 1970 fiscal year. The interest payments ($5,000 to $6,000 per day) on the loans necessary to keep operating were a considerable strain on the university's resources. Even when appropriated, the use of funds may be circumscribed because of the virtual line item control some state departments of finance have over many state college budgets. Pressures for increased fiscal accountability of *all* state expenditures, the emphasis and in some cases the requirement of program budgeting, the reaction against the governing power of faculty and students, and the failure of some coordinating boards to develop adequate alternatives to governmental control all pose real threats to traditional institutional governance patterns.

There are other legislative incursions into what traditionally have been institutional decisions. Recently the Michigan legislature passed legislation fixing faculty teaching loads at a minimum of ten contact hours per week for the University of Michigan, Michigan State, and Wayne State. State college faculty members are to carry a minimum of twelve contact hours per week, while those at community colleges are to have fifteen. In Ohio the legislature adopted House Bill 1219 under which the arrest of a faculty member, student, or staff member sets in motion a complex process of hearings and appeals and which, in cases of conviction, makes dismissal automatic.[3]

The potential effects of these two bills on governance are disturbing. Decisions that have traditionally been made by institutions themselves are now in the hands of external agencies, with the institution simply reporting the "facts" to a higher authority. These attempts to control institutions of higher learning are likely to increase in the

[3]Ibid., pp. 24-26.

near future. For example, legislatures are considering bills which would either abolish or reexamine tenure regulations in public colleges, while the New York legislature has passed a bill limiting sabbatical leaves for public employees.

A second external challenge to institutional governance patterns is the increasing resort to civil authority in campus crises and disciplinary cases. "The pressures of community police, the highway patrol, and the National Guard and the raids made by police without prior consultation with university administrators all symbolize the fact that colleges and universities have increasingly surrendered the privilege of self-regulation to the external authority of the police and the courts."[4] The courts are beginning to intervene, through the use of grand jury investigations and reports, in a variety of campus disputes.

When the New York University Senate allowed each school of the university to set its own requirements for course completion after the disruptions caused by the Cambodian invasion of spring 1970, the Law School permitted its students to take final examinations or not, as they chose. The New York Court of Appeals ruled on its own motion that those New York University students wishing to take the state bar examination had to complete all their courses by regular tests. Consequently law students had to return to the campus and take their examinations. One must remember in interpreting such incidents that one court decision establishes precedent for a host of others and modifies behavior to conform with judicial rulings.

The trend towards statewide coordination and master planning is also changing traditional authority relationships in higher education. According to Berdahl, coordinating and governing boards are operative in forty-six states.[5] Twenty-seven states have completed master plans

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[4]T. R. McConnell, *The Redistribution of Power in Higher Education* (Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1971), p. 14.

[5]Robert O. Berdahl, *Statewide Coordination of Higher Education* (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1971), p. 35.

and eleven others were either in the process of completing such plans or had plans to develop them.[6] In many cases, these plans threaten to move the locus of decision-making authority on certain issues away from the individual campus through the use of program budgeting and other such techniques. The final decision on whether to adopt a new program or to increase enrollment is often made by a state office rather than by the institution.

A fourth external factor which is challenging traditional governance patterns is the increasing frequency of multicampus systems. California has nine university and nineteen state college campuses. New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Texas, North Carolina, and many others also have multicampus systems, and some universities have a large number of branch campuses. The individual institution's capacity to make binding decisions is circumscribed by these systems or university-wide governing structures.

What is the likely outcome of these external incursions into institutional autonomy? Clark Kerr has predicted that in the future higher education will begin to resemble a quasi-public utility.[7] Some of the external forces mentioned above reflect increased public concern with higher education and with making the enterprise more accountable to the public interest. There has been a widespread public feeling that all colleges and universities, public and private, have not been responsive enough to the public interests. The criticism is that colleges and universities are run by faculty and administrators for their own vested interests rather than those of the public.

The concept of higher education as a public utility is an attempt to interject the public interest into the basic decision-making structure. The public utility model rests on two basic assumptions. First, it assumes that there is a basic conflict of interest between the public and the organization involved. The professionals in higher education cannot be trusted to consider adequately the public interests, and

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[6]Ibid., p. 81.

[7]Clark Kerr, "Alternative Models of Governance" (Address delivered at a national conference on Faculty Members and Campus Governance, Houston, February 18, 1971).

therefore higher education must be supervised or regulated. The institution's own vested interests will dominate its consideration of problems to the detriment of the public interest. Second, the public utility model assumes that higher education is a commodity or service, like electricity or telephones, to be provided for the public at a regulated cost. In the public utility model, costs and benefits are measured by traditional economic indices without appropriate consideration given to the noneconomic benefits of higher education. Yet if Kerr is right, and I suspect he may be, the autonomy of colleges and universities will be severely restricted through further incursions by governmental officials and legislatures, the courts, civil authorities, and coordinating boards.

B. Internal Authority. Within institutions, dynamic changes are occurring. Some governing boards are attempting to enhance their control of institutions through greater involvement in internal governance matters and through the use of their veto power. The Pennsylvania State University Board of Trustees issued a document in June 1970 which redistributed internal power and authority relationships and clarified the role of the president. In the past two or three years, the University of California Board of Regents has adopted a position of watchdog over such previously unmonitored areas as curriculum and personnel appointments on individual campuses.[8] Recent pressure by the Board of Regents at the University of Texas resulted in the dismissal of a college dean.

In the face of these challenges from external agencies and governing boards, faculty and students are demanding more sharing of authority within the institution and are getting a great deal of support in these demands. A national study of governance at nineteen campuses proposes "a reconsideration of authority relationships with a view to a more effective hearing for students, faculty, and other inadequately heeded constituencies."[9] The recent history of faculty participation in

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[8]T. R. McConnell and Kenneth P. Mortimer, *The Faculty in University Governance* (Berkeley: The Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1971), pp. 83-110.

[9]Morris Keeton, *Shared Authority on the Campus* (Washington, D.C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1971), p. 6.

campus governance has shown a preoccupation with the concept of shared authority as the means to increased faculty involvement.

In a system of shared authority both the faculty and administrators and, in some cases, students have *effective influence* in decision making. Although not precisely definable, the concept of effective influence involves participation relatively early in the decision-making process and a recognition that there are some issues, such as grading, on which faculty views should prevail and other issues, such as business management, on which administrative views should prevail.[10] Faculty influence should be effective on such aggregate issues as educational, administrative, and personnel policies; economic matters; and the procedures for making decisions on questions of concern to individual faculty.

The most recent statement on shared authority states that the sharing of authority takes two forms. One form is joint participation in decision making, and the other is agreeing that certain parties will, within defined limits, make the decision alone.[11] Shared authority debates tend to hang on this distinction between joint involvement and separate jurisdiction.

A major problem which the shared authority model has to confront, when contrasted with collective negotiations or binding arbitration, is that in order to work there must be a substantial degree of mutual respect and trust among the various constituencies. Each group must view the structures and functions of governance mechanisms as legitimate and the people who operate them as trustworthy. In a system of mutual trust and cooperation, influence and reasoned persuasion become the coin of the governance realm. In such a system, a large part of the citizenry can afford to be apathetic to governance problems because they have faith that their interests will be protected adequately and that those who make decisions will not violate the mores or the intellectual values of the higher education community.

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[10]AAHE-NEA Task Force on Faculty Representation and Academic Negotiations, *Faculty Participation in Academic Governance* (Washington, D. C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1967), pp. 27-30.

[11]Keeton, *Shared Authority*, p. 148.

It is increasingly apparent, however, that there is remarkably little legitimacy and trust left on college and university campuses. The overt conflicts and demonstrations of the sixties have put an unbearable strain on influence processes and resulted in an increased consideration of the elements of power. Where influence failed in getting the desired changes, the exercise of power through confrontation, coercion and occasional strikes, and/or formalization of procedures has had some modest success. Higher education now faces an era in which faith in procedures and rules is greater than that in the people who administer them and those who are regulated by them. This faith in rules rather than people represents a *fundamental shift* from the ideals of community and reasoned persuasion which have dominated American higher education for so long. Faith in rules is also related to the increasing emphasis on collective negotiations in higher education.

The essential difference between shared authority and collective negotiations is the latter's reliance on codified authority and power relationships. The American Association for Higher Education Task Force wrote: "When a majority of the faculty has chosen one organization as its bargaining agent . . . it has elected to place primary reliance on power in its dealings with the administration."[12] This power relationship is described as nonintegrative conflict ". . . in which at least one of the parties perceives the other as an adversary engaging in behavior designed to destroy, thwart, or gain scarce resources at the expense of the perceiver."[13] Such conflict creates dysfunction at an institution because the adversaries tend to channel much of their energies into resisting the threat rather than into constructive criticism.

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[12]AAHE Task Force, *Faculty Participation*, p. 46.

[13]Maurice R. Duperre, "Faculty Organizations as an Aid to Employment Relations in Junior Colleges," *Employment Relations in Higher Education*, ed. Stanley Elam and Michael Moskow (Bloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappa, 1969), pp. 182-83.

The contrast between the shared authority and collective negotiations models is to be one of the crucial governance issues of the seventies.[14] It has become increasingly apparent that the future viability of shared authority mechanisms will rely heavily upon the relationships that are developed between faculty and administrative members. There is a crucial need for clarification of the relative roles to be performed by faculty and administrators in the internal governance of the university. Some would include boards of trustees, students, and other constituencies in this clarification process. In the absence of such clarification, Livingston has said that ". . . the prospect is for increased tension between faculty and governing boards with administrators caught hopelessly in the middle."[15]

The pressures for adoption of shared authority mechanisms are such that over 300 institutions are experimenting with campus senates comprised of students, faculty, and administrative members.[16] New senates are being created and structures are being modified to provide more direct input and broader representation in campus governance.

II. The Trouble with Senates

Research concerning senates as mechanisms for the implementation of shared authority has identified some basic problems in their

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[14]It is important to note that an external force (the state legislature)may permit resolution of the issue by passing legislation which enables employees (faculty) in public colleges and universities to choose an association and negotiate. Another external agency, the National Labor Relations Board, has assumed jurisdiction over private universities which requires these institutions to negotiate with appropriately certified employee groups.

[15]John C. Livingston, "Academic Senate Under Fire," *Agony and Promise*, ed. G. Kerry Smith (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969), p. 166.

[16]Harold L. Hodgkinson, "The Next Decade,"*Research Reporter* 1 (1970): 6.

operation.[17] These problems may be classified as inadequate representativeness, lack of accountability, internal politicization, and lack of purpose.[18]

A. Representativeness. Generally, senates are not representative of the plurality of interests and perspectives found in college and university faculty. The pattern of faculty participation in senates parallels the pattern of citizen involvement in political government. There is a group of apathetics who do not participate at all—or even exercise their franchise. A second group, the political spectators, remain relatively well informed about governance and occasionally participate in it by performing committee work or engaging in frequent political disucssion. A smaller group, less than 10 percent, are political gladiators or oligarchs.[19] These faculty members are quasi-administrators who spend a good deal of their time in governance activities. For example, of the 590 people who served on senate committees at the University of California, Berkeley over a ten-year period, 60 percent served on one committee, 23 percent served on two committees, and 10 percent served on three committees. The remaining 7 percent

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[17]The concern here is only with describing the problems in senate operation rather than the relative advantages of senates as opposed to collective negotiations. There is little research on the latter, but some essays are available. See Donald H. Wollett, "Status and Trends of Collective Negotiations," *Wisconsin Law Review* 1971 (No. 1): 24-29; and T. R. McConnell and Kenneth P. Mortimer, *University Governance*, pp. 179-81.

[18]The data relative to this section of the paper are reported in Kenneth P. Mortimer, "The Structure and Operation of Faculty Governance: Who Rules and How?" (Paper delivered at a national conference on Faculty Members and Campus Governance, Houston, February 18, 1971).

[19]For a more detailed discussion of this framework see Kenneth P. Mortimer and T. R. McConnell, "Faculty Participation in University Governance," *The State of the University: Authority and Change*, ed. Carlos E. Kruytbosch and Sheldon L. Messinger (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970), pp. 111-31

served on from four to seven committees. Other data confirm the point that senate affairs tend to be dominated by these gladiators through control of information, maintenance of secrecy in many areas of senate affairs, and control of the committee appointment process.

Other aspects of inadequate representativeness include seniority on senates and senate committees. At some universities, where they represent only 25 percent of the faculty, full professors often comprise 60 percent of the senate committees. Membership on many committees is limited to full professors, especially those committees dealing with senate operation, personnel matters, and educational policies.

Senates are also said to represent only the views of the academic establishment and to exclude those with divergent values and views from their memberships. Radicals, for example, do not get elected to senates or appointed to senate committees. In some instances senates have inadequate representation from certain academic disciplines, usually the foreign languages and some professional schools. In many cases, senates do not adequately represent the multicampus composition of many universities, newer campuses often being underrepresented.

Because of these and other imbalances in the composition of senates and their committees, there is often a widespread recognition that senates represent only those who are *directly* involved in their decision-making processes. "Responsible" radicals, liberals, and students often feel that a senate does not represent their views, and they attribute little legitimacy to it. The gladiators who tend to control senate affairs represent only the more traditional values. In times of crisis these gladiators are likely to be separate from and even unaware of the views of the younger, more radical members of their constituency who are most likely to be involved in the crisis. Experienced administrators know that they cannot depend solely on the advice and consultation of gladiators because they are often out of touch with important segments of the faculty and student constituencies.

B. Accountability. Senates are said to lack accountability. Certainly they have little sense of accountability to the public interest as mentioned earlier. More important, when senates act as a decision

maker, there is often no opportunity to appeal an adverse decision. In fact, many advocates of collective negotiation argue that it is superior to senate activity because, among other things, a contract provides for specific grievance and appeal procedures. Of course, many institutions have these amenities without a formal contract.

The charge of lack of accountability in senates is rooted in the fact that they are hard to control and that the base for senate actions is diffused over such a wide area that there is no single locus of responsibility. Responsibility is often diffused through a large number of committees operating independently of each other and without adequate coordination. Administratively, senates often operate inefficiently. They fail to provide for routine follow-up of legislation and spend a great deal of time debating relatively unimportant matters.

These criticisms are not, in my opinion, crucial, for they can be overcome. In some cases, efficiency and responsibility are not the major criteria by which senate performance should be judged.

C. Internal Politicization. On many campuses the internal politicization of the senate has run apace. Faculty groups muster the votes necessary for passage by lobbying for their pet proposals. Junior faculty and student senators form coalitions to push such measures as antiwar resolutions through the senate. In some cases voting on certain issues is regarded as a question of loyalty to one's informal group rather than an exercise of one's own discretion; in other cases voting adheres strictly to party lines with little consideration for educational substance.[20]

In many instances the debate on issues that come to the senate is over political considerations rather than educational matters, and power conflicts often supersede concern for the educational mission or integrity of the institution. Resolutions are frequently hammered out in party caucuses well in advance of senate debate.

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[20]For some examples at Columbia, the University of New Hampshire, and the University of Minnesota see David Dill, *Case Studies in University Governance* (Washington, D. C.: National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, 1971).

D. Lack of Purpose. As one observes the behavior of senates in a variety of institutions it becomes increasingly apparent that they often lack a sense of purpose. They are trying to perform functions that they are ill-equipped to handle and are ignoring areas where they should be involved.

It is generally conceded that senates perform badly in times of crisis or when quick decisions are needed. They are simply not aware of the terrible complexities involved in making the decisions necessary at these times, nor are they representative enough to consider all the various points of view. Because a senate cannot be held accountable for the advice it renders in times of crisis, it should not be the principal agency consulted; but, if possible, it should be among the many agencies consulted before action is taken.

Senates are at their best when they have time to deliberate and critically review educational proposals. They should not be expected to initiate proposals for reform, although they should be encouraged to do so. Since senates perform the review function best, that is what they ought to do. They should be very reluctant to deal in legislative and/or administrative detail.

Senates must also consider what role they play in the overall governance system of the institution. It may be hard, for example, for an institution to have both an influential senate and a separate bargaining agent because it will be difficult to separate jurisdictions between them. Similarly a policy of strong college autonomy within a complex university is likely to limit the areas in which a senate can operate effectively. If constituent colleges are to have the power to reorganize themselves internally, the senate's role in evaluating such reorganization must rely on persuasion rather than power. Perhaps persuasion is the correct governance pattern for an institution. It *is* clear that merely establishing a senate will not automatically result in new governance patterns. The specific responsibilities and advisory functions must either be spelled out in the initial legislation or there is likely to be little change in the governance process.

III. Institutions of Higher Education are Political in Their Governance Relationships

Institutions of higher education are composed of a myriad of factions, each of which has its own views about the fundamental nature of the enterprise. Governors, legislatures, the courts, and governing boards expect a measure of accountability and expect the public interests to be interjected into institutional governance patterns. Many faculty are interested in preserving individual autonomy and professional influence as the governance standard. An increasing proportion of faculty and students are interested in moving away from influence to codified power relationships. What can institutions do to adjust to some of these new realities? The course will not be easy, but some suggestions can be made.[21]

1. Colleges and universities must begin to develop new and broader definitions of representativeness. Some institutions (e.g., Columbia and Queens College) have made specific provision for representation of nontenured faculty and students on their senates. Others have moved to form campus-wide or community consultative structures in which researchers, clerical staff, and alumni are represented. The plurality of interests which is apparent on most campuses should also receive some consideration in any representative scheme of governance. Those of the majority viewpoints must be careful to include as many minority views as possible in the governance process.

2. To avoid the rigidities associated with senates and other institutionalized structures, these mechanisms should be kept structurally simple. They should have as few standing committees as possible. In their stead colleges and universities should formulate more *ad hoc* structures for the resolution of problems. Temporary committees and task forces should be used to study problems, and they should be disbanded when their task is completed. By this means one could hope to avoid the rigidities of bureaucratic structures and situations in which conflicts accumulate from issue to issue or from person to person.

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[21] T. R. McConnell and Kenneth P. Mortimer, *University Governance*, pp. 183-189.

3. Colleges and universities should clarify jurisdictions and develop "democratic" procedures to a greater extent than they have to date.

   a. Many of the preoccupations of the late 1960s concerning parietal rules and student conduct should be resolved through a consensually developed set of rules and procedures which would institutionalize the canons of due process. There should be specified appeal procedures for any student who feels he has been treated unjustly by administrators or faculty members. Few practicing administrators can afford to spend large amounts of time in resolving these conflicts, which routinization may be able to solve for them. These procedures should incorporate the right of appeal for almost any administrative decision, whether made by faculty or administrators.

   b. The relative roles of each structure of the governance process should also be clarified. If senates are to advise the administration on educational policies the advisory function should not be left to chance, but procedures to accomplish such functions must be specified.

4. Finally, the composition of governing boards, which are the major link between institutions and the public, should be changed to reflect a more pluralistic constituency. Lay membership should no longer be confined mainly to those who represent wealth, position, or political power. Boards must become responsive to a wider range of economic interests, to a pluralistic political constituency, and to a more diverse pattern of ethnic and cultural backgrounds. They should also maintain some student and faculty representatives, and there should be increased opportunity for joint discussion among administrators, faculty, students, alumni, and other constituencies.

IV. Normality of Conflict

Those who yearn for "peace" in the university will find that it is a relative condition. Colleges and universities may hope to free themselves from serious disruption and violence, but it seems certain that they will have to live with controversy and conflict in the foreseeable future. There are many sources of discord from external forces

like governments, the courts, and civil authorities. Internally there are several competing interests. There is disagreement over the fundamental nature of the university. Opposed to those who insist that the university's purpose is to search for truth, analyze the shortcomings of society, and propose methods of social reform but avoid direct social action, are those who would make the institution an active instrument of social revolution. The debates on the relative emphasis between teaching and research, and on the primacy of professional versus liberal education will continue. On a more mundane level, there will be a struggle for scarce resources and demands for greater autonomy. There is also growing tension between faculty and administration, and faculty and governing boards, and there may be growing conflict between faculty and students. Unionism and collective negotiations may intensify adversary relations among faculty, students, administration, and trustees, all of which will continue to struggle for power. These controversies and conflicts will be considered "normal" to the university, and the resolution of such dissension, rather than the management of violent disruption, will be the norm for future operation.

Students of organizational behavior have attempted, without great success, to formulate alternative models of university governance. They have discussed bureaucratic and democratic models, collective bargaining, and other prototypes. Perhaps a general political model offers a useful framework for resolving conflicting university interests since the political system is essentially a mechanism for translating competitive interests and internal conflict into policy.

Conflict, however, should be regarded as a natural phenomenon in academic governance. According to Foster "The central issue . . . is whether it is better to approach the university as an organization in which unity, harmony, and consensus is the norm and the ideal, or whether it should be seen as a forum for permanent conflict."[22] Although conflict can be so intense as to destroy the university, it can

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[22]Julian F. S. Foster, "A Political Model for the University," *Educational Record* 49 (Fall 1968): 436.

stimulate progress and innovation. Conflict can lead to greater understanding of substantive issues and to more rigorous debate of alternative courses of action. Social theorists have argued that institutionalized conflict is a stabilizing mechanism in loosely structured organizations and open societies.[23] By permitting direct expression of conflicting claims, these societies can readjust their priorities and procedures by eliminating sources of dissatisfaction and causes for dissociation. Thus, through tolerating institutionalized conflict, institutions of higher education may reestablish unity, or at least reach a tolerable solution to the issues that divide them.

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[23]Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (New York: The Free Press, 1956).

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Collective Bargaining: Implications for Governance*

Kenneth P. Mortimer
G. Gregory Lozier

Introduction

The recent advance of collective bargaining into higher education is such that many colleges and universities may anticipate several changes of potentially major proportions in their decision-making patterns. One feature of collective bargaining is the discontent on the part of many faculties with informal or noncodified procedures in matters relevant to the terms and conditions of their employment and to the provisions for faculty participation in Institutional decision making. As a result, collective bargaining portends to interject major changes in faculty-administrative relations in higher education.

The major thrust of this paper is an analysis of some of the implications that collective bargaining has or is likely to have on traditional modes of academic governance. The authors have reviewed the governance-related provisions in thirty-one collective bargaining contracts, the summary of which appears in Appendix A of this report. In addition, an exhaustive search of the literature has provided an extensive bibliography on the topic of collective bargaining in higher education (Appendix B).

The Extent of Collective Bargaining

As of May 1972, formal recognition had been granted to faculty associations on 254 campuses in 167 colleges and universities, involving approximately 15 percent of the nation's faculty.[1] Better than 85 percent of the agencies are located in eight states—New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Wisconsin, Massachusetts, Illinois, Washington, and Kansas. The above data include only situations in which formal recog-

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[1] *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 6 (May 15, 1972): 2.

nition has been granted. There may be as many as 800 other institutions in which faculty associations "meet and discuss" terms and conditions of employment with representatives of the board.[2]

These 167 colleges and universities include 121 two-year and 46 four-year institutions with formally recognized bargaining agents. Among the four-year colleges are the SUNY and CUNY systems in New York, the New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Nebraska State Colleges, six of the nine Massachusetts state colleges, St. John's University, Rutgers University, Central Michigan University, Southeastern Massachusetts University, Oakland University, and the University of Wisconsin (teaching assistants only). Between 35 and 40 of these colleges and universities chose bargaining representatives between summer 1971 and May 1972, and developments from one month to the next assure that bargaining will continue to grow. The first steps which *could* lead to bargaining have been taken in a number of other four-year institutions including the University of Hawaii, Temple University, and The Pennsylvania State University branch campuses. Run-off elections are still to be conducted at Wayne State University and Eastern Michigan University, where there was no majority winner in the initial election.

Two major legal developments have provided added momentum to the move toward collective bargaining. First, approximately twenty states, including New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Hawaii, and Michigan, have passed enabling legislation which compels public institutions to recognize duly chosen bargaining representatives, or have enacted permissive legislation which does not specifically prohibit bargaining with public employees.[3] However, less than half of this state legislation covers, or is interpreted to cover, private educational institutions.[4] Second, in 1970 the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) filled the void in state legislation for private higher education by assuming jurisdiction over private postsecondary institutions with gross

[2]Joseph W. Garbarino, "Creeping Unionism and the Faculty Labor Market," mimeographed (Berkeley, Calif.: Carnegie Commission on Higher Eduation, Fall 1971), p. 17.

[3]Tracy H. Ferguson, "Collective Bargaining in Universities and Colleges," *Labor Law Journal* 19 (December 1968): 778-804.

[4]William F. McHugh, "Collective Bargaining with Professionals in Higher Education: Problems in Unit Determination," *Wisconsin Law Review* 1971 (No. 1): 61.

revenues of over one million dollars. These legal developments are significant because, although enabling legislation does not *require* collective bargaining, it does remove many of the barriers which prohibit it. Experiences in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania show that state enabling legislation is closely followed by several petitions for certification of bargaining agents in public institutions and that the NLRB ruling has had a similar impact on private institutions.

There can be little doubt that collective bargaining has become an important feature of American higher education. It also is apparent that there are some important distinctions between collective bargaining and more traditional modes of faculty-administrative relations. Some of these distinctions are discussed below.

Shared Authority and Collective Bargaining

Much of the current literature in higher education supports a governance system that implements the concept of sharing authority among interdependent constituencies in the academic organization. The term "shared authority" itself is applied to a wide range of decision-making practices. There are three models of shared authority: joint participation in decision making; agreements to separate jurisdictions among interdependent constituencies; and collective negotiations.[5] As one moves from joint participation to collective negotiations the tenor of relationships between the faculty and administration changes from one of mutual influence and persuasion to reliance on codified, formal authority relations embodied in a legally binding agreement.

The most common heuristic comparison to illustrate this continuum is the contrast between an academic senate, presumably an example of joint participation and/or separate jurisdictions, and collective negotiations. Five distinctions can be drawn between senates and collective bargaining.

[5]See "Statement on Government of Colleges and Universities," *AAUP Bulletin* 52 (Winter 1966): 375-79; *Faculty Participation in Academic Governance: Report of the AAHE Task Force on Faculty Representation and Academic Negotiations, Campus Governance Program* (Washington, D. C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1967); and Morris Keeton, *Shared Authority on Campus* (Washington, D. C.: American Association for Higher Education, 1971).

First, although senates may have some basis for their existence in the documents of the institution, their scope of operations is dependent upon board or administrative approval. In some cases, changes in senate structures and operations are mandated by the board. For example, in June 1970, the Board of Trustees at The Pennsylvania State University issued, without substantial prior consultation, a directive which significantly restricted the senate's scope of operations. In contrast, no such unilateral change could be made in the structure of a faculty bargaining agent or in the terms of a negotiated contract without prior approval of the agent and its governing body.

Second, academic senates normally are dependent on institutional appropriations for their operating funds. In California the legislature cut by approximately 40 percent the 1970-71 budget request of The University of California Academic Senate. This type of action severely restricts the extent to which senates can engage staff support to further their work. A faculty association or union relies on a dues structure for its financial support. A local association will often receive additional funds and support services from its national affiliate to help bear the costs of election campaigns and the negotiation process. Senates often experience some difficulty in obtaining the necessary actuarial and legal expertise, which associations or unions maintain through national affiliates.

Third, many senates are based on individual campuses and do not reflect the statewide or multicampus nature of much of higher education. Where statewide senates are in existence they have yet to develop substantial lobbying or political power with state legislatures. Some associations, particularly the National Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers, claim they have such lobbying power and are active in attempting to influence the political decision-making process as it applies to the interests of education.

Fourth, the membership of senates usually includes faculty, administrators, and, more recently, students. In some cases the administration tends to dominate the senate.[6] Faculty associations are more

[6]Kenneth P. Mortimer, "The Structure and Operation of Faculty Governance: Who Rules and How?" (Paper delivered at a conference on Faculty Members and Campus Governance, Houston, Texas, February 17-18, 1971).

clearly dominated by faculty members—some even exclude administrators from their membership. In cases where the negotiation process has started, there is a legally binding separation between administrators (management) and the faculty (employees), imposed by the definition of who is in the "faculty" bargaining unit. Students seldom are involved in collective negotiations.

Fifth, senates are likely to be less concerned about adequate grievance and appeal mechanisms. They often do not provide an avenue of appeal from their own decisions. A decision is not correct merely, as Lieberman argues, because a senate or one of its committees has made it.[7] Associations negotiating contracts will almost always specify an avenue of appeal from decisions made by either the faculty or the administration.

These are some of the essential differences between the senate model, as an example of sharing authority through joint participation or separate jurisdictions, and the collective negotiations model. While these two approaches to the sharing of authority may not be mutually exclusive, they do appear to be at opposite ends of a continuum. It is possible that senates could negotiate binding contracts as they have at Macomb County Community College (Michigan) or collaborate with a faculty agent as at St. John's University. It is also possible, in cases where some other agent negotiates a contract, that a senate will find it very difficult to maintain its precontract scope of operations. In other cases senates may find it possible to coexist with a separate bargaining agent.

It does seem apparent that collective bargaining encourages the separation of the faculty and the administration in that it tends to eliminate administrative control over association activities, to create a faculty group with its own financial resources and with separate access to governmental agencies, and to result in a legally binding definition of who is management and who is labor. Collective bargaining, through its emphasis on grievance procedures, tends to codify the policies and procedures which will provide the framework for many future contacts

[7]Myron Lieberman, "Representational Systems in Higher Education," *Employment Relations in Higher Education*, ed. Stanley Elam and Michael Moskow (Bloomington, Ind.: Phi Delta Kappa, 1969), pp. 60-61.

between faculty and administrators. The operational ramifications of this separation and codification of faculty-administrative relations are as yet unclear, but there are some apparent directions.

Definition of the Bargaining Unit

A significant decision affecting future faculty-administrative relationships is the determination of an appropriate bargaining unit. This decision, establishing the division between management and employees, often is not made by the institutions themselves. The agencies which have authority in unit determination are the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for private institutions, and state labor relations boards for public institutions.

In its earliest rulings the NLRB, formed by the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, established a precedent for seeking a "community of interest" in determining appropriate bargaining units in business and industry. Common interests and desires of groups of employees; their prior history, customs, and patterns of negotiations; and the extent to which employees already were organized were variables utilized to assess a bargaining unit's community of interest. In contrast, to determine exclusion from the unit, prime consideration was placed upon an individual's supervisory activities, such as the extent of his involvement in personnel affairs.

Additional questions must be answered in higher education. Do those who are not full-fledged faculty, e.g., those with part-time appointments, librarians, and student personnel staff, share a "community of interest" with the faculty? Should deans and department chairmen be classified primarily as faculty members or as supervisors, and therefore be given representation in the bargaining unit? In a number of instances, librarians (except for chief, or head, librarians), laboratory assistants and technicians, counselors, and student personnel staff are being included in the bargaining unit with the faculty. For example, about 27 percent of the SUNY bargaining unit is made up of nonteaching professionals. Regardless of the purposes or reasons for previously keeping the two groups separate, collective bargaining has now forced them into one common unit. In contrast, on the Buffalo (SUNY) campus nonfaculty professionals did not have representation on the senate, nor were they eligible to become members of the local American Association of University Professors (AAUP) chap-

ter, one of the national associations bying for bargaining status. At the AAUP's annual meeting in May 1972, during which the Association made a new and stronger commitment to collective bargaining, an amendment was adopted which eliminates the conflict created by non-AAUP members' inclusion in the AAUP bargaining unit. In the future, nonacademic professionals who are included in the bargaining unit may obtain AAUP membership.

The definition of a bargaining unit at the City University of New York (CUNY) appears unique. CUNY has an approximately equal number of full-time faculty with academic rank and instructors with titles of lecturer or teaching assistant. Many of the latter teach on a part-time basis, and are dependent upon other employment for their primary source of income. The New York Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) ruled that two bargaining units should be established and separate elections held. (As will be noted later, this decision had significant bearing upon the eventual choice of a collective bargaining agent.) Factors other than employee status also may be involved in unit determination. At Fordham, a private institution, the NLRB ruled that the law school faculty was discrete enough to constitute a separate bargaining unit. This and other such decisions may result in a proliferation of elections and bargaining agents.

In general, labor relations boards are concluding that many nonfaculty professional staff, though not primarily concerned with teaching, share a community of interest with the teaching faculty. The lists of titles included under the Definition of the Bargaining Unit in Appendix A show that the unit includes on a regular basis librarians, counselors, and research technicians. The activities of these nonfaculty staff are being considered as supportive of, and clearly associated with, the activities of the faculty. Collective bargaining is challenging some of the barriers between the faculty and support personnel, and may result in the development of new alliances within the university for the establishment and implementation of policy.

In answer to the question of who is supervisory, academic deans quite clearly are management and excluded from the bargaining unit, although assistant and associate deans, based upon their administrative as opposed to supervisory responsibilities, are included in the SUNY unit. There is more ambiguity, however, about the position of

department chairman, especially when four-year institutions are compared with community colleges.

Our analysis of eight contracts for full-time faculty in four-year institutions (Southeastern Massachusetts University, Central Michigan University, New Jersey State Colleges, Bryant College of Business Administration, City University of New York, Oakland University, Rutgers University, and St. John's University) revealed that department chairman at these universities were *included* in the bargaining unit. In an analysis of twenty-one community college contracts, the authors found seventeen institutions in which the language was clear enough to indicate the status of department chairmen. Fourteen of these contracts *excluded* the department chairmen from the unit. A report on faculty contracts in Michigan public community colleges showed that only four of twenty-four colleges specifically include department or division chairmen in the bargaining unit.[8] This seems to be consistent with the hierarchical structure of many two-year colleges where the department chairman tends to be viewed as a representative of the administration.[9]

In cases where the department chairmen are in the unit, there may be some revision of their position as representatives of the faculty. The 1969-72 CUNY contract for full-time faculty members includes department chairmen in the bargaining unit. For the past two years there has been considerable discussion about whether department chairmen at CUNY should continue to be elected by majority vote of all department members having faculty rank. Some administrators advocated a change, to have department chairmen appointed by and accountable to the president and the board.[10] The faculty, through its bargaining agents and senates, has consistently opposed this pro-

[8] *Analysis of Faculty Contract Information at Public Community Colleges in Michigan, 1969-70*, (Lansing: Michigan Community College Association, April 1970), p. 38.

[9] Peter Blomerley, "The Two-Year College Department: A Study of the Rule of the Department and the Department Chairman in Academic Governance" (Ph.D. diss., the State University of New York at Buffalo, 1969).

[10] Matthew W. Finkin, "Collective Bargaining and University Government," *AAUP Bulletin* 57 (Summer 1971): 158.

posal, but to no avail. Department chairmen at CUNY are now appointed by the administration and it remains to be seen whether their roles will change as a result of this move.

In those institutions where department chairmen are excluded from the bargaining unit or become identified as management's representatives, an interesting and new role may develop within the department. In industry, a group of workers is supervised by a job foreman who represents management. The position of shop steward has been established to represent the employees. It is possible that within the academic department, the department chairman clearly will be management's representative, while another faculty member will be chosen to speak for the department's faculty on those issues related to the collective bargaining agreement. In those institutions where adversary relations between the faculty and the administration dominate, departments may have both chairmen and department stewards.

Collective Bargaining, Presidents, and Boards

Collective bargaining may also significantly modify the relations between faculty and other administrators, especially the president and his central administrative staff. The position the president and his staff take relative to collective bargaining may be crucial in determining whether future faculty-administrative relations will assume an adversary or a more cooperative posture.

There are restrictions on a president's freedom to discuss his personal feeling and attitudes about collective bargaining with the faculty. Both federal and state labor legislation typically forbids employers from interfering, restraining, or coercing employees in their organizing activities or inclinations. Some presidents have attempted to dissuade their faculty from associating with organizations favoring collective negotiations, or from voting for an agent. For example, one community college president distributed several presidential bulletins to the faculty, noting the inappropriateness of unions in higher education and the disadvantages of the collective bargaining process. The local faculty association seeking recognition as a bargaining agent was informed by its state organization that according to state law this type of interference clearly constituted an unfair labor practice and entitled the local association to file charges against the president. The *New York Times* documents similar charges against the Chancellor of the

City University of New York for issuing, prior to representative elections, a partisan brochure opposed to collective negotiations, a violation of New York law prohibiting overt attempts by the employer to influence the outcome.[11] In the absence of collective bargaining, presidents and other representatives of management have been relatively free to direct and/or influence faculty activities. Collective bargaining has the potential of removing the presidents from such positions of influence and further reducing the informal ties between faculty and administration. Once a petition for an election has been filed it is hazardous for a president to adopt a position either for or against collective bargaining.

Once a bargaining agent is chosen, the role of the president and his staff will vary with the circumstances. The contract for public multicampus institutions is negotiated with a statewide office, as is the case for the Pennsylvania State Colleges and University where the contract is being negotiated with a state executive agency, the Office of Administration. A significant number of institutions are negotiating their contracts with a city or county board of education which may have jurisdiction over several community colleges, or even over all levels of education, kindergarten through college (see Table III, Appendix A). In all of these situations (statewide, county, or city negotiations), the campus president and his staff assume their primary responsibilities only after the agreement has been negotiated and they become responsible for administering the contract and for applying any local provisions. Typically the campus president is mentioned in the grievance procedures and is responsible for implementing this and other provisions of the contract. In a single campus institution, the association representing the faculty unit usually negotiates with representatives of the Board. In such instances the president or his representative becomes part of the management team in contract negotiations.

The rhetoric in higher education indicates that institutional boards of control have ultimate authority and accountability for all institutional decisions. In reality a host of external controls impinge on this authority, especially in public institutions. Essential economic decisions are being influenced, and sometimes dictated, by politicians, budget technicians, statewide coordinating agencies, and state legislatures. For the purposes of collective bargaining, public boards seldom

[11] *New York Times* Nov. 24, 1968, p. 86; Nov. 27, 1968, p. 31.

have the legal power to negotiate binding financial agreements (contracts) requiring additional funds; their ability to attain the necessary funds relies upon their powers of persuasion and their capacity to influence the appropriate external agencies. Because of these external restrictions, contracts negotiated by public boards often contain a clause or article such as the following:

> It is agreed by and between the parties that any provision of this agreement requiring legislative action to permit its implementation by amendment of law or by providing the additional funds therefore [sic], shall not become effective until the appropriate legislative body has given approval.[12]

In many instances, the ultimate status of a contract is dependent on legislative approval of appropriations to cover salary increases and other economic benefits in the contract. There are other, less understood issues which also may require legislative action. The qualifications for various academic ranks, sabbatical leaves, and promotion policies, and many other aspects of personnel policies in Pennsylvania's state colleges are a matter of state law. Some negotiated changes in these policies may have to be the subject of legislative action to achieve implementation. The contract for the Pennsylvania State Colleges and University is being negotiated with the state Office of Administration, but some of its fiscal *and* personnel policy provisions may have to be validated by the Pennsylvania Legislature.

By its very nature, collective bargaining is an adversary process. The major concern about administrative and trustee involvement is whether the adversary process of negotiating an agreement carries over to other areas of faculty-administrative-trustee relations. Although the answer may depend on the personalities involved and the previous tenor of these relationships, it is difficult to foresee how colleges and universities can effectively separate relationships which operate in collective bargaining from those operative in other areas of academic decision making.

12"City University of New York Agreement Between the Board of Higher Education of the City of New York and United Federation of College Teachers Local 1460, AFL-CIO," Article XXX, Legislative Action, p. 25.

The adversary, or competitive, environment of collective bargaining is not limited to relations between faculty and administration. Competition among faculty associations is also inherent in the process.

Exclusivity and Competition Among Associations

Exclusivity is a fundamental tenet of collective negotiations in both public and private higher education. It requires that one and only one bargaining agency represent equally all employees in the unit. Three major national associations (The American Federation of Teachers—AFT, The National Education Association—NEA, and the American Association of University Professors—AAUP), as well as some local independent organizations, are competing for representation rights. Exclusivity makes winning an election extremely important to these associations. Once an election is held, the winner is the sole representative of the employee unit for the duration of a negotiated agreement. Within this time, the right to exclusivity gives the "in" association the opportunity to improve upon its position. As an example, if the employer agrees to a dues checkoff (collection of association fees from faculty payrolls) solely for the negotiating agent and denies this privilege to all other faculty associations, this association is given a clear competitive advantage in maintaining and in increasing its membership. Of those contracts reviewed in Appendix A, only two specify provisions which permit voluntary dues checkoff for associations other than the bargaining agency. It is possible that exclusivity could lead to the development of union or agency shops, when permissible under state legislation. In a union shop all members of the employee unit must join the representative association, while in an agency shop all members of the unit must pay a fee to the association, usually equivalent to membership dues. In Michigan, where agency shops are permissible under state law, three of the eight two-year college contracts reviewed for this study are already operating under agency-shop provisions of employment (see Table III, Appendix A).

The competition between competing associations creates what are in essence political issues. Pressures to enlist members and to win or retain representative status contribute to the political atmosphere. The competition requires the development of an experienced bargaining staff, and the funds necessary to support this staff and pay for the expenses accrued during elections and negotiations. Local asso-

ciations find it difficult to muster these resources and to maintain their independent status. *After* the elections at both the City University of New York and the State University of New York, the Legislative Conference of the former and the Senate Professional Association of the latter affiliated with the National Education Association, partly because neither local association could sustain the entire cost of election campaings and contract negotiations.

Another key political issue at CUNY was the decision to have two separate bargaining units and elections. The United Federation of College Teachers (UFCT-AFT) had pressured for the adoption of a single unit, but the state PERB ruled against this position. The part-time professional unit elected the UFCT-AFT as its agent by giving it 1,634 of the 3,263 votes cast. In a run-off election for the full-time professional staff, the Legislative Conference won by a margin of 2,067 to 1,634. Had the PERB decision ruled for one inclusive unit, the UFCT-AFT might have won the entire election. However, developments in spring 1972 have created circumstances which may drastically alter the collective bargaining scene at CUNY. The two bargaining associations have merged and petitioned the PERB to unite the two units. The CUNY administration, on the other hand, has taken the position that the units should remain separate and that a third unit should be created for the professional support personnel. This issue must be resolved before the current contracts which expire August 31, 1972, can be renegotiated.

There also is likely to be some competition between traditional faculty organizations, such as senates, and unions. The American Association for Higher Education governance report suggested that it has been the objective of most campus unions merely to apply pressure to senates, the administration, and conservative faculty associations.[13] Israel Kugler of the American Federation of Teachers also has written that unions and senates should complement one another. Rather than being opposed to senates, the Federation seeks to achieve full, not merely advisory, authority for senates in such professional areas as curriculum, enrollment policies, and academic standards.[14] William

[13] *Faculty Participation in Academic Governance*, p. 37.

[14] Israel Kugler, "The Union Speaks for Itself," *Educational Record* 49 (Fall 1968): 416.

Hayward of the New Jersey Education Association (NJEA-NEA) has stated that in New Jersey, where the six state colleges have adopted collective negotiations, the representative agency (NJEA) has attempted to work side by side with faculty senates. He suggested that the two organizations do not compete, but serve different functions.[15]

There are far more people, however, who anticipate that an inevitable conflict exists between collective bargaining and faculty senates.[16] In several collective bargaining elections, faculty senates have filed for inclusion on the ballot. In the preelection proceedings at SUNY, the American Federation of Teachers contended that the Faculty Senate of the University was an inappropriate employee organization as defined by the New York State Public Employees' Fair Employment (Taylor) Act. The Federation contended that the Senate's financial dependence upon the University and its inclusion of non-faculty administrators in its membership constituted the establishment of a company union. The Public Employment Relations Board ruled that the Senate was an employee organization within the definition of the Taylor Law. The Board also noted, however, that since the issue was not properly raised in the proceedings, their decision did not deal with the collateral issue of whether the Senate was in fact employer-dominated. At Eastern Michigan University, the AFT affiliate asked again that the faculty senate be disbanded as a company union, barred under Michigan labor law definitions. The issue to date has not been adequately resolved, and it is possible that at some future time a senate will be ruled an employer dominated company union.

[15]In Elam and Moskow, *Employment Relations in Higher Education*, p. 80.

[16]For example, see C. M. Larson, "'Collective Bargaining' Issues in the California State Colleges," *AAUP Bulletin* 53 (Summer 1967): 217-27; Roger W. Opdahl, *Faculty Participation in Academic Decision Making in "Emerging" State Colleges* (Williamsport, Pa.: Economic Research Associates, Inc., 1971); T. R. McConnell, *The Redistribution of Power in Higher Education: Changing Patterns of Internal Governance* (Berkeley, Calif: University of California, Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1971); Joseph W. Garbarino, "Precarious Professors: New Patterns of Representation," *Industrial Relations* 10 (February 1971): 1-20; Dexter L. Hanley, "Issues and Models for Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," *Liberal Education* 57 (March 1971): 5-14.

In institutions where both a senate and a separate bargaining agent attempt to operate there is likely to be a conflict over their respective jurisdictions. The bargaining agent will assume many of the functions senate committees formerly performed, including the activities of committees on faculty welfare, personnel policies, and grievances. Some bargaining agents have attempted to get their respective faculty senates' constitution and bylaws written into the contract, thereby giving the senate binding authority rather than advisory status. Other contracts have sought to provide assurances that both the bargaining agent and other decision-making structures will be involved. The agreement with St. John's University stipulates that the senate as well as other existing and duly constituted organizations shall continue to function as long as they do not interfere with or modify the bargaining contract. At Central Michigan University, the contract stipulates that two members of a professional awards committee will be appointed by the Academic Senate. The agreement with Bryant College in Rhode Island dictates that the Curriculum Committee and the Rank and Appointment Committee will have five voting members to be elected from the faculty by the Faculty Federation. The collective bargaining agreement for the Community College of Philadelphia designates that standing committees shall be composed of an equal number of administrators, employees, and students. Employee representatives of these committees are to be appointed by the faculty bargaining agent. (For additional examples, refer to the "Statement on Academic Governance" sections in Tables I and II, Appendix A.)

As seen in these examples, it is not possible to make any blanket statements about the inevitability of conflict between coexisting senates and bargaining agents. Very likely, incompatibility will be the result in some institutions. In others, the two organizations may find convenient and compatible accommodations which will strengthen the effectiveness of each group. Senates may continue to operate in those areas not covered in the contract. The major issue is whether such matters as educational and curricular policy, admissions, tenure, and academic freedom will be left to a senate or will be included in the contract. This issue in turn depends upon the definition of the scope of negotiations.

Scope of Negotiations

Discussions about collective bargaining tend to concentrate on salaries, fringe benefits, and other conditions of employment. The full scope of collective negotiations is, however, "up for grabs." As Ray Howe of Henry Ford Community College in Michigan, one of the earliest colleges to feel the impact of a faculty strike, has so aptly put it, "I know of no practical limits upon the negotiability of any items affecting the college. The determination of what is negotiable is itself negotiable."[17] It is not at all risky to surmise that existing contracts may not reflect the situation which will develop by 1980. The scope of contracts is likely to broaden. Ralph Brown has detailed how a collective bargaining agency can absorb what have been traditional areas of faculty control.

> First, the matter of salaries is linked to the matter of workload; workload is then related directly to class size, class size to range of offerings, and range of offerings to curricular policy. Dispute over class size may also lead to bargaining over admissions policies. This transmutation of academic policy into employment terms is not inevitable, but it is quite likely to occur.[18]

Not all of the items sought in collective bargaining agreements are included in the final contract. One might look to such proposals for an indication of what the bargaining agent considers negotiable. The proposals of the Legislative Conference at CUNY, a case in point, show the expandability of "terms and conditions of employment." The Conference wanted a series of clauses in the contract under the general heading of "Faculty Control of Educational and Policy Matters." These included: (1) University Senate and Faculty Council approval of University Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, and University Dean, and Campus Presidents, Provosts, and Dean, respectively; (2) Incorporation of the University Senate's Charter into the contract as well as those provisions of the bylaws specifying the election and composition of the Senate, the Faculty Councils, and the General Faculty; (3) No changes in admissions policy, grading, or curricula and programs

[17] In Elam and Moskow, *Employment Relations in Higher Education*, p. 90.

[18] Ralph S. Brown, Jr., "Collective Bargaining in Higher Education," *Michigan Law Review* 67 (February 1969): 1075.

without an affirmative vote of the governing faculty body involved or of the University Senate; (4) Senate or Council review of budgets at least two weeks prior to their submission to the Board of Higher Education. Not only does this provide evidence of the feasible extension of the scope of collective negotiations, but it also verifies a sincere attempt on the part of the Legislative Conference to incorporate many senate activities into the contract and thereby make them binding on the administration.

We have already noted that bargaining agreements frequently specify the means for appointing department chairmen and deans. The Southeastern Massachusetts contract specifies that the department chairman is to be appointed by the dean; in the New Jersey State College contract he is to be elected by the members of the department with the approval of the president. The selection of a dean by the president and board of trustees at St. John's University must adhere to the recommendations of a faculty search committee; only those names submitted by the faculty committee may be considered. As already noted, contracts have been ratified which also specify college committee appointments. It is a rare contract which does not include a grievance procedure; many are developed in considerable detail.

In the matter of salaries, bargaining agreements tend to substitute the "objective" standards of seniority and time in rank for the principle of merit. The emphasis is upon the development of salary scales to equalize faculty salaries. (This situation is not entirely a feature of collective negotiations. Many institutions not under contract have had salary scales for years.) The argument is that faculty members of equal rank and longevity are entitled to equal pay. While a few clauses are found which allow for merit raises above and beyond the minimum salaries provided for by the contract, pressure upon the administration to abide by the scale may inhibit the free distribution of merit increments.

The elimination of merit raises does not bother some. There are those who are skeptical about the existence of a true merit system under former salary arrangements. There are other faculty members who are concerned with the current tight money situation in education and with the arbitrary nature with which increments are often granted. These faculty members anticipate that while a salary scale will assure them of yearly salary increases, the merit system guarantees them

nothing. The ability of an institution to continue a policy of merit raises may depend largely upon the effectiveness of a merit system prior to the adoption of collective bargaining.

It is possible that collective bargaining may modify the traditional link between academic freedom and tenure. There is some debate about whether academic freedom ought to be negotiable or whether it is a nonnegotiable right. The AAUP holds the position that academic freedom is not negotiable. It is clear, however, that tenure as *job security* is a proper subject of negotiation.

Van Alstyne cites two possible effects that collective bargaining may have on tenure.[19] First, it is possible that tenure, academic freedom, and academic due process will be "traded-off" for more immediate gains such as increased salary and fringe benefits. This certainly would tarnish the conception that tenure is a necessary component of academic freedom. A second, and perhaps more likely, possibility is that the five- to seven-year probationary period, which tends to be common in four-year institutions, will be shortened to one or two years.

> As collective bargaining becomes prevalent, and as the views of junior faculty members come to weigh heavily in the negotiating process, a condition of instant tenure may be demanded. That is to say, the job security provision could apply even in the first or second year of appointment, so that the termination decision could not be made without a fairly elaborate demonstration of reasonable cause.[20]

Existing contracts, as reviewed by the authors, tend to document the trend toward this second possibility. Whereas in the agreements for four-year institutions support is given typically to existing tenure policies, the contracts for the two-year institutions stipulate probationary periods ranging from only two to four years, to be followed by an indefinite continuing appointment. Procedures for evaluation, reappointment, dismissal, and other related tenure provisions in these agree-

[19]William W. Van Alstyne, "Tenure and Collective Bargaining," *New Teaching, New Learning*, ed. G. Kerry Smith (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1971), pp. 210-17.

[20]Van Alstyne, "Collective Bargaining," p. 216.

ments are most often extensive and fairly well-defined. Only one college limits appointments to annual terms, and even in this instance, failure to issue a contract for reappointment can be only for cause.

A third and related possibility is that, rather than eliminate tenure, collective bargaining may extend its job security benefits to a wider proportion of the faculty and to the nonteaching professional staff who are members of the bargaining unit. Indeed, it is hardly likely that these staff members would be excluded from the procedural and probationary aspects of the contract. Finally, in some state institutions, e.g., the state colleges in New Jersey, procedures for tenure are provided by state law. Any attempts to alter these provisions are conditional upon legislative action to amend the existing law.

Conclusion

It is difficult to predict, at this early stage of collective bargaining, what patterns of governance will emerge from the give and take of the bargaining process. Local and institutional differences may contribute to remarkably different results. The impact which specific negotiations have upon faculty-administrative relations is likely to be dependent upon the tenor of these relations before negotiations.

This study has, however, identified several trends which appear to be important. First, the definition of bargaining units appears to be pushing towards a homogenization of regular faculty with part-time faculty and professional nonteaching staff. Although in future developments there may be greater proliferation of bargaining units within a campus, such as separate units for law and medicine, multicampus units will tend to homogenize the differences among staffs at different kinds of institutions within the same system, i.e., there will be salary equity between the faculty in four-year and two-year campuses which are under the same contract. Second, collective negotiations is leading to greater codification of faculty-administrative relations, especially through specified grievance procedures and personnel policies. Third, collective bargaining is likely to diminish the influence and scope of operations of senates and other traditional governance mechanisms. Fourth, although the scope of initial collective bargaining contracts may be limited to terms and conditions of employments, such limita-

tions may not remain in subsequent contracts. Fifth, tenure is likely to become more common as collective bargaining spreads, although it may be regarded as a means of obtaining job security rather than of enhancing academic freedom.

Collective bargaining is by no means inevitable on any given campus. Most four-year institutions still have the opportunity to analyze existing personnel policies and ascertain whether legitimate grievances exist. An institution can develop its own grievance and appeal procedures, make its personnel policies more equitable, and informally agree about many issues short of the formal collective negotiations process. Such flexibility may be effectively lost once a petition for certification is filed by a potential bargaining agent. Once a petition is filed the administration can be forced to limit its discussion of the pros and cons of collective negotiations by an agent which charges it with unfair labor practices. Furthermore the standards of judgment in the electoral process rapidly become political and the faculty may come to regard the administration as one contending party in a competitive election.

Once a bargaining agent is chosen, however, institutions should assess carefully what positive goals might be attained in the bargaining process. Garbarino has suggested one such positive approach—the productivity agreement. The productivity agreement is the result of a series of concessions by both sides which, for example,". . . might involve trading a multi-year wage and fringe package and more flexible calendar scheduling for an agreed-on definition of work load, flexibility in assignments, and more detailed conduct guidelines."[21] The substance of such agreements must be prepared carefully so that basic freedoms are not treated lightly or sacrificed to the general desire to reach an agreement. It is possible that such "packages" will enhance educational impact if they are put together wisely and with some understanding of their implications.

In conclusion, collective bargaining and traditional modes of academic governance do not have to be an either-or dichotomy. Surely, certain inevitable and as-yet-unknown strains may develop. Perhaps the single most pertinent advice one can give to institutions involved in

[21]Garbarino, "Precarious Professors," p. 20.

collective bargaining is to plan carefully what can be achieved through the process to enhance the institution's effectiveness. The task will not be easy, but the challenge must be met.

APPENDIX A:

TABLE 1
GOVERNANCE-RELATED PROVISIONS
IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS OF
TEN FOUR-YEAR INSTITUTIONS

TABLE 2
GOVERNANCE-RELATED PROVISIONS
IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS OF
TWENTY-ONE TWO-YEAR INSTITUTIONS

TABLE 3
SUMMARY OF GOVERNANCE-RELATED PROVISIONS
IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS OF
TEN FOUR-YEAR AND TWENTY-ONE TWO-YEAR INSTITUTIONS
(SUMMARY OF TABLES 1 AND 2)

TABLE 1

GOVERNANCE-RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS OF TEN FOUR-YEAR INSTITUTIONS

Institution	Duration of Agreement	Parties to the Agreement	Agency Affiliation	Definition of the Bargaining Unit	Dues Checkoff Provisions	No-Strike Clause
Bryant College of Business Administration	5/21/69-7/31/71; 8/1/71-7/31/72	"Bryant College" and "Bryant College Faculty	AFT	All full-time faculty (including department chairmen)	Voluntary	No
Central Michigan University	9/1/71 - 6/30/74	"Central Michigan University" and "C.M.U. Faculty Association"	Michigan Education Association-NEA	Full-time faculty, librarians, coaches, counselors, & department chairmen; part-time faculty with faculty rank & minimum 2/3 teaching load	Voluntary	Yes
City University of New York (A)*	9/1/69 - 8/31/72	"The Board of Higher Education of the City of New York" & "the Legislative Conference"	NEA	Full-time faculty, research faculty, business & fiscal officers & assistants, registrars & assistants, department chairmen, college physicians, technicians, and counselors	Voluntary	Yes
City University of New York (B)*	9/1/69 - 8/31/72	"The Board of Higher Education of the City of New York" and the "United Federation of College Teachers, Local 1460"	AFT	Lecturers and teaching assistants	Voluntary	Yes

TABLE 1

Institution	Management Rights Clause	Grievance Procedure	Statement on Academic Governance	Academic Freedom Clause	Tenure Provisions	Appt. of Department Chairmen	Appt. of Academic Deans
Bryant College of Business Administration	No	Any grievance arising from the contract may be submitted to binding arbitration	Provides for election of the voting members of the Curriculum & the Rank and Appointment Committees by the Faculty Federation	None	None	None	None
Central Michigan University	No	Informal—2 steps; formal—2 steps; voluntary arbitration	Each academic department is responsible to develop its own procedures for faculty participation in determining departmental recommendations to the University, & to develop appeal mechanisms for use in the department	Continues existing policy on academic freedom	Supports existing university policy on tenure & appointment, though subject to later negotiations	None	None
City University of New York (A)*	Yes	Informal—1 step; formal—3 steps; binding arbitration	None	Supports 1940 AAUP Statement	Procedures for notice of appointment, reappointment, professional evaluation	None	None
City University of New York (B)*	Yes	Informal—1 step; formal—3 steps; binding arbitration	None	Supports 1940 AAUP Statement	Procedures for notice of appointment, reappointment, professional evaluation	None	None

TABLE 1

Institution	Management Rights Clause	Grievance Procedure	Statement on Academic Governance	Academic Freedom Clause	Tenure Provisions	Appt. of Department Chairmen	Appt. of Academic Deans
New Jersey State Colleges	Yes	5 steps, including voluntary arbitration	Representatives of the Association to partici-in the development of state master plan; the Association is permitted to appoint one representative to each college-wide standing committee	None	As "provided by state law," lists procedures for appointment, retention, promotion	Elected by the department, approved & appointed by the president	None
Oakland University	Yes	4 steps, including binding arbitration	Supports the continued rights, privileges, & responsibilities of faculty to participate in formulation & recommendation of educational policy	Supports 1940 AAUP Statement	Supports the existing university policy	Supports existing university policy	Supports existing university policy
Rutgers University	No	4 steps	"Agreement in no way diminishes the responsibility of faculty, department chairmen, & deans, directors & other appropriate administrative officials for the exercise of academic judgment"	Supports the principles of academic freedom as adopted by University Board of Governors	None	None	None

TABLE 1

Institution	Duration of Agreement	Parties to the Agreement	Agency Affiliation	Definition of the Bargaining Unit	Dues Checkoff Provisions	No-Strike Clause
New Jersey State Colleges	7/1/70 – 6/30/72	"State of New Jersey & the Board of Higher Education" & the "Association of New Jersey State College Faculties, Inc."	New Jersey Education Association–NEA	Full-time teaching & research faculty, department chairmen, nonmanagerial administrative staff, demonstration teachers, & professional academic support staff with faculty rank	Voluntary; four faculty organizations eligible	Yes
Oakland University	11/12/71 – 6/30/72	"Oakland University Board of Trustees" & "Oakland University Chapter of the AAUP"	AAUP	Teaching & research faculty, department chairmen, director of area studies, inner college chairmen, & exploratory program coordinator	Voluntary	Yes
Rutgers University	12/1/70 – 6/30/72	"Rutgers, the State University" & the "Rutgers Council of the AAUP"	AAUP	Full-time (minimum 50% faculty load) instructional & research faculty; members of the research, library, general extension, & cooperative extension staffs, & others with equivalent academic rank	Voluntary	No
Southeastern Massachusetts University	6/1/70 – 6/30/73	"S.M.U. Board of Trustees" and "S.M.U. Faculty Federation"	AFT	Full-time & part-time faculty, department chairmen, librarians, professional technicians	Voluntary	Yes
St. John's University	7/1/70 – 6/5/72	"The Administration of St. John's University," & "St. John's University Chapter of the AAUP & the Faculty Association of St. John's University"	AAUP	Full-time & regular part-time faculty, department chairmen, professional librarians, laboratory instructors, & research associates	None	Yes
University of Wisconsin–Madison Campus	4/70 – 9/72	"University of Wisconsin–Madison Campus" & "Teaching Assistants Association"	None	Teaching assistants	Voluntary	Yes

TABLE 1

Institution	Management Rights Clause	Grievance Procedure	Statement on Academic Governance	Academic Freedom Clause	Tenure Provisions	Appt. of Department Chairmen	Appt. of Academic Deans
Southeastern Massachusetts University	Yes	5 steps, including binding arbitration	None	"Original" statement (detailed)	Defines tenure, due process, & procedures for evaluation	Appointed by college deans from department recommendations	Selected by 7 member committee, 3 members to be approved by federation
St. John's University	Yes	3 steps, including binding arbitration	Senate to continue to function providing it does not conflict with the agreement	Supports 1940 AAUP Statement	Supports existing policy with modifications regarding the make-up of personnel committees	None	Elaborate procedure for nominations by a search committee of no fewer than 3 candidates for recommendation to the board for final approval
University of Wisconsin-Madison Campus	Yes	4 steps, including binding arbitration	None	None	None		None

*The City University of New York has two agreements and is represented twice.

TABLE 2

GOVERNANCE-RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS OF TWENTY-ONE TWO-YEAR INSTITUTIONS

Institution	Duration of Agreement	Parties to the Agreement	Agency Affiliation	Definition of the Bargaining Unit	Dues Check-off Provisions	No-Strike Clause
Illinois						
Belleville Area College	Academic year 1970–1971	"Board of Trustees of Belleville Area College District no. 522" & "Belleville Area College Chapter of the AAUP"	AAUP	All regular faculty, including instructors teaching a load of 3/5 of more; librarians, counselors, supervisors, coordinators	No	No
Morton Community College	9/1/70–8/31/71	"The Board of Junior College District 527, Cook County" and "The Morton Council, Local 571"	AFT	Teaching faculty, counselors, professional librarians, department chairmen	Voluntary	Yes
Prairie State College	6/13/70–end of spring term 6/72	"Board of Junior College District no. 515" & "Prairie State College Chapter of the Cook County Teachers Union, Local 1650"	AFT	Full-time faculty, librarians, counselors, department chairmen and/or directors	Voluntary	Yes
Sauk Valley College	9/1/70–	"The Board of Junior College District no. 506" & "Sauk Valley College Faculty Association"	None	Full-time instructional staff & counselors	None	No
Maryland						
Community College of Baltimore	7/1/71–6/30/72	"The Board of Trustees of the Community College of Baltimore" & the "Community College of Baltimore Faculty Federation Local 1980"	AFT	All individuals holding academic rank, counselors, & librarians (excludes head librarians & supervisory counselors)	Voluntary	Yes

TABLE 2

Institution	Duration of Agreement	Parties to the Agreement	Agency Affiliation	Definition of the Bargaining Unit	Dues Check-off Provisions	No-Strike Clause
Michigan						
Genesee Community College	8/16/70–8/14/71	"Board of Trustees of Genesee Community College" and "Genesee Community College Education Association"	Michigan Education Association–NEA	Full-time and part-time teaching faculty, counselors, area coordinators and health counselors (excludes all directors, chairmen, managers, and supervisors)	Agency shop	No
Grand Rapids Junior College	8/24/70–8/22/71	"The Board of Education of the City of Grand Rapids" & the "Faculty Council of the Grand Rapids Junior College"	Not specified	Faculty, librarians, and counselors	Voluntary	Yes
Highland Park College	9/25/70–6/30/72	"The School District of the City of Highland Park" & the "Highland Park Federation of Teachers"	AFT	All certified teachers, all college instructors, nurses, counselors, K-12 department chairmen, psychological diagnosticians, special-education teachers, systemwide department coordinators, assigned substitute teachers & nurses (excludes all other K-12 & college administrative personnel)	Agency shop	Yes
Kalamazoo Valley Community College	9/1/71–8/31/73	"Kalamazoo Valley Community College Board of Trustees" & the "Kalamazoo Valley Community College Faculty Association"	Michigan Education Association–NEA	Full-time instructional staff, counselors, and librarians (excluding chairmen and directors)	Voluntary	No
Lake Michigan College	12/28/70–8/12/72	"The Board of Trustees of Lake Michigan College" & "Lake Michigan College Federation of Teachers"	Michigan Federation of Teachers–AFT	Full-time instructors, assistant librarians, counselors, health service coordinators (excludes all administrative & supervisory employees)	Voluntary; MEA and AAUP also eligible	Yes

TABLE 2

Institution	Duration of Agreement	Parties to the Agreement	Agency Affiliation	Definition of the Bargaining Unit	Dues Check-off Provisions	No-Strike Clause
Lansing Community College	9/15/69-9/13/71	"Board of Trustees of Lansing Community College" & "Lansing Community College Chapter of the Michigan Association for Higher Education"	Michigan Education Association-NEA	Full-time instructional staff (excludes department heads)	Voluntary	No
Macomb County Community College	9/1/70-8/31/72	"Board of Trustees of the Community College District of the County of Macomb" & "Macomb County Community College Faculty Organization"	None	Full-time teachers, counselors, librarians, & research assistants (excludes chairmen, directors, coordinators, supervisors, & their assistants)	Agency shop	No
Southwestern Michigan College	9/1/71-8/15/72	"Board of Trustees of the Southwestern Michigan College" & "Southwestern College Education Association"	Michigan Education Association-NEA	Full-time & regular part-time faculty, counselors, librarians, department chairmen, director of nursing & director of athletics	Voluntary	No
New York						
Auburn Community College	7/1/70-7/1/72	"Board of Trustees of Auburn Community College" & the "Auburn Community College Faculty Association"	None	Full-time professional staff employees with faculty rank	Voluntary	No
Hudson Valley Community College	9/1/69-9/1/71	"The Board of Supervisors of the County of Rensselaer and the "Board of Trustees of Hudson Valley Community College Faculty Association"	None	All teaching faculty with librarians (excludes department chairmen)	Voluntary	No

TABLE 2

Institution	Duration of Agreement	Parties to the Agreement	Agency Affiliation	Definition of the Bargaining Unit	Dues Check-off Provisions	No-Strike Clause
Nassau Community College	9/1/69–8/31/71	"The County of Nassau" & "The Faculty Senate of Nassau Community College"	None	Instructional & library staff, counselors, theater production personnel, & several nonmanagerial administrative assistant positions	None	No
Westchester Community College	9/1/69–8/31/71	"The County of Westchester" & "The United Federation of College Teachers, Local 1460"	AFT	Full-time & regular part-time professional staff (excludes directors & chairmen)	Voluntary	No
Pennsylvania						
Community College of Philadelphia	9/1/70–8/31/72	"Community College of Philadelphia" & "The Faculty Federation of Community College of Philadelphia, Local 2026"	AFT	Full-time regular faculty (excludes heads, supervisors, & directors)	None	Yes
Lehigh County Community College	8/23/71–8/22/72	"Lehigh County Community College" & "Lehigh County Community College Faculty Association"	Pennsylvania State Education Association–NEA	Teaching faculty, guidance counselors, librarians, & student activities coordinator (excludes division chairmen & directors)	Voluntary; maintenance of membership	Yes
Washington						
Seattle Community College	7/1/69–6/30/70	"Seattle Community College Board of Trustees" & "Seattle Community College Federation of Teachers"	Not Specified	Full-time & part-time instructional faculty; counselors & student personnel administrators; librarians, audiovisual specialists, & other nonadministrative employees (excludes administrative heads & chairmen)	Voluntary	No
Olympic College	7/1/70–6/30/71	"Trustees of Community College District No. 3" & "The Olympic Chapter of the Association for Higher Education"	Not	All certificated personnel	None	Yes

TABLE 2

Institution	Management Rights Clause	Grievance Procedures	Statement on Academic Governance	Academic Freedom Clause	Tenure Provisions	Appt. of Department Chairmen	Appt. of Academic Deans
Illinois							
Belleville Area College	No	4 steps, including advisory arbitration	None	None	None	Appointed by board, recommended by president from 2 nominations from department faculty	None
Morton Community College	No	4 steps; final step is appearance before the board	Standing committee is elected by faculty; union representative on all committees	None	None	Elected by members of department; approved by dean & president	None
Prairie State College	Yes	3 steps, including advisory arbitration	None	"Original" statement	Tenure granted after 3-year probationary period, according to procedures defined in Policies & Procedures Manual	Appointed annually by president from 3 leading vote recipients in a secret departmental preferential ballot	None
Sauk Valley College	Yes	4 steps, including binding arbitration	None	None	Extensive: definition, provisions for appointment dismissal, promotion, evaluation; 3-year probationary period	None	None

TABLE 2

Institution	Management Rights Clause	Grievance Procedures	Statement on Academic Governance	Academic Freedom Clause	Tenure Provisions	Appt. of Department Chairmen	Appt. of Academic Deans
Maryland							
Community College of Baltimore	Yes	4 steps, including advisory arbitration	Faculty Senate is the voice of the faculty for all noncontractual items	"Original" statement (detailed)	3 year probationary period followed by election to tenure for 4th year; provisions for non-reappointment and evaluation	None	None
Michigan							
Genesee County College	Yes	5 steps, including binding arbitration	Educational policy determined by divisions; College Professional Study Committee—and advisory committee to the president and board	"Original" statement (fairly detailed)	Continuing contracts after 3-year probationary service; provisions for dismissal and evaluation	CPSC ad-hoc committee to review credentials for all candidates of administrative position; board's decision is final, but must be explained in writing if requested by CPSC	
Grand Rapids Junior College	Yes	5 steps, including binding arbitration	None	"Original" statement (brief)	Provisions according to the State Teacher Tenure Act; special section in which parties agree to renegotiate all related tenure provisions	None	None
Highland Park College	Yes	5 steps, including advisory arbitration	Union must be given the opportunity to recommend teachers for membership on all committees	"Original" statement (detailed)	Abides by provisions of the state teacher tenure act	Teachers in a department may file written recommendations to dean of college	None

TABLE 2

Institution	Management Rights Clause	Grievance Procedures	Statement on Academic Governance	Academic Freedom Clause	Tenure Provisions	Appt. of Department Chairmen	Appt. of Academic Deans
Kalamazoo Valley Community College	Yes	5 steps, including binding arbitration	None	"Original" definition (detailed)	Indefinite continuing appointment after probationary period (4 years for new teachers, 3 for experienced); provisions for evaluation	None	None
Lake Michigan College	Yes	4 steps, including binding arbitration (1st step informal)	None	"Original" statement (detailed)	Continuing contract after 2-year probation; procedures for evaluation and termination	None	None
Lansing Community College	Yes	5 steps, including binding arbitration	The administration will make a continuing effort to effect greater faculty involvement in affairs of the college	Supports 1940 AAUP Statement	Continuing contract after 2-year probation; termination for cause; evaluation procedures	Recommended by department according to departmental procedures; appointed by board	None
Macomb County Community College	Yes	4 steps, including binding arbitration	Defines structure, membership, & function of all standing committees	Principles defined under section titled "Teachers' Rights" (extremely detailed)	Permanent contract after 2-year probationary contract; procedures for evaluation, due process, & termination	None	None
Southwestern Michigan College	Yes	3 steps; final review by the board (1st step informal)	None	"Original" statement (brief)	Annual terms of employment, though termination of employment is subject to grievance procedures; not subject to provisions of Teachers Tenure Act	None	None

TABLE 2

Institution	Management Rights Clause	Grievance Procedures	Statement on Academic Governance	Academic Freedom Clause	Tenure Provisions	Appt. of Department Chairmen	Appt. of Academic Deans
New York							
Auburn Community College	Yes	4 steps, including binding arbitration (1st step informal)	None	"In accordance" with 1940 AAUP Statement	4½ years' service prior to granting of indefinite continuing appointment; provision for termination of employment and promotion	Appointment by president upon recommendation of full professors in department	Notice of vacancy in administrative position must be circulated among faculty 20 days prior to publication elsewhere
Hudson Valley Community College	Yes	4 steps, including binding arbitration (1st step informal)	None	"Original" statement (detailed)	3-year probationary period; provisions for termination of appointment; contract renewed; and performance evaluation	None	None
Nassau Community College	No	5 steps, including final, binding decision by the county executive	Defines responsibilities of the faculty, faculty senate, and senate committees	"Original" statement (detailed)	Supports 1940 AAUP position on tenure; defines procedures and establishes a college-wide promotion and tenure committee	Appointment upon recommendation by department by president	Recommended by review committee, 2 members of which are elected by Senate
Westchester Community College	No	Informal—1 step; formal—3 steps, including binding arbitration	Confers upon a faculty senate the right of consultation with the administration for professional matters, educational policy, etc.	"Original" statement (detailed)	Definition of tenure, 3-year probation, removal for cause (4 pp. of procedures and provisions)	None	None

TABLE 2

Institution	Management Rights Clause	Grievance Procedures	Statement on Academic Governance	Academic Freedom Clause	Tenure Provisions	Appt. of Department Chairmen	Appt. of Academic Deans
Pennsylvania							
Community College of Philadelphia	Yes	4 steps, including binding arbitration	Supports standing committees	"Original" statement (detailed)	Defines tenure and steps for granting tenure and employment termination	Recommended to provost by division director and committee elected by department	None
Lehigh County Community College	No	3 steps, including binding arbitration	None	None	No termination of employment after 2 full years of employment except for cause	None	None
Washington							
Olympic College	No	Procedures to be followed specified in Faculty Handbook	None	"Original" statement (detailed)	Specific procedures for non-renewal of contract; no tenure apparent	None	None
Seattle Community College	No	3 steps, including advisory arbitration	Provides for faculty representative on board & president's cabinet, & establishes faculty-administrative committees	"Original" statement (limited)	Defines tenure & procedures for granting or withholding tenure	Specifies deadlines applying for position ranking of applicants by department members, & recommendation to president	None

TABLE 3

SUMMARY OF GOVERNANCE-RELATED PROVISIONS IN THE COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING AGREEMENTS OF TEN FOUR-YEAR AND TWENTY-ONE TWO-YEAR INSTITUTIONS

(Summary of Tables 1 and 2)

Provision	Number of Contracts* by Type of Institution		
	4-year	2-year	4-year and 2-year
Average length of agreement (months)	25.7	18.4	20.8
Management's party to the agreement			
Institution's Board	7	11[@]	18
City or County Board	2	11[@]	13
State Board	1	0	1
Agency affiliation			
AAUP	3	1	4
NEA	3	5	8
AFT	3	7	10
Local or not specified			9
Inclusion of department chairmen	8[+]	3[@@]	11
Dues checkoff			
Voluntary	9	13	22
Agency shop	0	3	3
No-strike clause	8	9	17
Management-rights clause	7	14	21
Grievance procedures			
Average number of steps	4.1	4.1	4.1
Binding arbitration	7	13	20
Statement on Academic Governance	3	10	13
Academic-freedom clause			
Original statement	3	15	18
AAUP statement	4	2	6
Average probationary period for tenure (years)	–**	2.9	–
Procedures for appointment of department chairmen	3	10	13
Procedures for appointment of academic deans	3	3	6

*Several figures represent an average number of months, years, etc., rather than the number of contracts.

[@]Hudson Valley Community College includes both county and college board representation.

[+]Two units do not include the regular full-time faculty.

[@@]Four units do not specify clearly the position of the chairmen.

**Unclear or unspecified.

APPENDIX B

I. BIBLIOGRAPHY:

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN HIGHER EDUCATION

II. BIBLIOGRAPHY:

SELECTED LISTINGS DEALING WITH COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR AND/OR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

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Institutes and the University*

Stanley O. Ikenberry
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The fundamental issue of this study is the place of institutes in the university. Are they useful additions to the university's organizational configuration, or do they only verify the confused purposes, the fragmentation of structure, and the dissipation of resources some claim are part of the problem? These questions are not easily answered, for they relate to basic assumptions about the fundamental goals of the university.

Few components of the university have been criticized as sharply or frequently by students, faculty, and administrators as have institutes and centers. They allege that institutes undermine the teaching function and distract faculty from a dispassionate pursuit of truth. Substituted is a kind of academic capitalism, an orientation toward profit rather than education. The results are distorted academic reward structures and confused university purposes. Another frequent criticism is that institutes, at the very least, have complicated an already impossible organizational structure. These criticisms must be faced, but to do so we must first tackle those assumptions about the nature of the university.

Purposes of the University

Essays on the objective of the university are legion, and yet none is definite. Clark Kerr and others hold that the university has no single purpose but rather multiple purposes held together by a single corporate structure. The distinction between university and multiversity reflects the shift from the essential unity in the pre-World War II university to the present state of multipurposes, some of which may be in apparent conflict and contradiction. The classical view is that the university has no purposes, at least none as defined in utilitarian terms. The pursuit of truth is synonymous with purpose and the means are ends in themselves. The primary function of the corporate body, therefore, is to provide a setting for scholarly activity.

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The debate is not new. Francis Bacon several centuries ago argued against an adoration of the mind. Bacon postulated that knowledge should be used for the benefit of man, that it gained meaning as it was put to use. Cardinal Newman, in his *Idea of a University* (1860), set forth the contrary view: that knowledge is capable of being its own end and needs no utilitarian defense. The clash between these two apparently conflicting philosophies is at the root of the differing views about the place of institutes. Is the university a means toward more important social goals, or are the pursuit of truth and maintenance of the academic community necessary and sufficient ends?

Those who want the university to be without utilitarian purpose ask for an improbable luxury. Knowledge is the fuel central to a scientific, technological, and socially complex society; it is the nourishment society must have to function and prosper. The rapid escalation of the power of the university results from its role in the knowledge industry as a principal producer and distributor. From this point of view, one could argue persuasively that the raison d'etre of the contemporary university is not knowledge for its own sake but knowledge for society's sake.

Recognition of the social utility of universities does not require them to be totally subservient to day by day variance in social whim or preference. Hard-won traditions of academic freedom were designed, in large part, to protect not only scholars but their institutions from those repressive forces in all ages that would bend the truth to conform to their own beliefs and purposes. What must be argued and reargued within the academy, for it is easily forgotten, is that a university must not be conceived principally as an instrument of present-day society and its value judged solely in terms of its immediate and obvious usefulness. Social utility, in other words, must be assessed with the perspective of time and with a broad view of institutional purposes.

While recognizing the difficulty of making short-term judgments of social utility, the requirement that the university relate itself to the needs of society is in no way relieved. Colleges and universities are among the social institutions most vulnerable to the hazards of goal displacement. Means can be substituted for ends, and the immediate gratification of professional needs may precede social requirements.

Those who call for increased accountability—legislatures, governmental agencies, students, the courts, governing boards, foundations, the press, and the general public—no doubt believe that the relationship between what the university does and what society needs is not as direct and as strong as it should be. The proposition "knowledge for society's sake" asks the university to reexamine the requirements of the world and the nature of its efforts to meet them. Those who support institutes tend to view them as an important instrument in strengthening this bond between university programs and societal needs.

Those within universities, however, tend to see the matter differently. Faculty members, for example, usually view the university in nonutilitarian terms. In a survey of university goals, Gross and Grambsch were able to identify seven on which there was general agreement within the academic community. The highest purpose of the university according to faculty members, was to protect their right to academic freedom. Other goals, ranked in order of importance, included the need to maintain the prestige of the university and top quality in those programs felt to be especially important; ensure the confidence and support of those who contribute to finances and other material resource needs; keep up to date and responsive; train students in methods of scholarship, scientific research, and/or creative endeavor; and carry on pure research.[1] This cluster of objectives regarded by faculty members to be most important could hardly be faulted as overly utilitarian. Interestingly, the goal accorded least significance in a list of forty-seven was to make a good consumer of the student—a person who is elevated culturally, has good taste, and can make good consumer choices.

Added to this nonutilitarian charterization is the claim that colleges and universities are different from organizations in the business and industrial sector. The nature of the difference and its implications, however, are not well understood either by those within the academic community or by society at large. The major distinction lies in the inability of higher education institutions to clearly define their goals and purposes and to build their organizational structure in accord with them. The Gross and Grambsch study indicates this lack of clarity: Most of the goals ranked highest in importance tend to be support goals, not functional ones. Maintenance of the academic community and the academic life style has become synonymous, in the minds of many, with the ultimate purposes of the university.

[1]E. Gross and P. V. Grambsch, *University Goals and Academic Power* (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1968).

One need look no further than college catalogs to document the difficulty experienced by academic organizations in defining their objectives. Statements of institutional purpose frequently communicate little of the significant educational goals of the institution. The translation is accomplished primarily through the curriculum. Yet the curriculum may not be highly rational in design, and many courses are not supported by a well-developed syllabus. Even with the existence of a carefully developed syllabus, it is the faculty member who must infuse the course with purpose and meaning.

Efforts to encourage institutions to clarify their mission and to state goals in precise operational terms are persistent but of modest yield. In spite of well-intentioned dedication, such attempts are typically only moderately successful, and the benefits generally are short-lived. The apparent failures do not stem from any necessary lack of expertness but relate directly to the intangible and complex nature of the academic task. Each student, for example, brings to the institution his own personal aspirations for the future and his own unique cluster of abilities, prior experiences, achievement, and growth potential. Faculty members are no less limited by their own experiences and competencies and cannot give to students or to the institution what they do not have.

As a result, colleges and universities have genuine difficulty in articulating their purposes. For good or ill, they have compensated for the lack of definition by delegating and decentralizing responsibility. Much of the authority for determining ends and means is delegated by the higher or central positions to the lower or operative levels. And, the larger and more complex the institution, the more significant delegation of authority and responsibility. Whether formally or by informal tacit agreement, academic departments and individual faculty members tend to participate heavily in setting institutional purposes and in determining the most effective means of achieving them. The content of courses, the nature of the curriculum, faculty work loads and schedules, and the selection, retention, and promotion of professional employees--these and other matters are strongly influenced by individual faculty members and by departmental action. The complexity of the academic task makes strong central control not only difficult but perhaps unwise. The bulk of the power and authority has been delegated to the academic department.

Academic Departments

The ascendancy of the department has paralleled the so-called knowledge explosion and the rise of the academic organization to a position of power in society. Academic departments are the principal organizational component of the university. Dressel, Johnson, and Marcus in their study of the department characterized the complex functions it performs: instructing and advising undergraduate majors; instructing undergraduate non-majors; instructing graduate students; advising or consulting with professors from other disciplines; basic research; applied research; promoting the discipline within the university; promoting departmental views and interests in the college and the university; promoting the discipline and profession nationally; exploring interfaces of the disciplines; promoting career development of junior staff; attaining national recognition for the department; providing consultation services to business and industry and to governmental units; providing a scholarly and congenial environment in which to work; and providing a social and recreational network for those affiliated with the department.[2]

The multifunctional character of the academic department is its most distinguishing quality in a comparison with the institute. Authority for defining the emphasis among functions is usually held by the chairman and by members of the departmental faculty. Despite its wide range of activities, the department is not functionally organized. The central focus is the discipline; the use to which the discipline is put—undergraduate or graduate instruction, basic or applied research, or programs of public service or continuing education—is another matter and not necessarily tied to the existence of the department.

Institutes and centers, as we stated earlier, tend to be organized around tasks or functions and to be multidisciplinary. Their range of functions is circumscribed. Most institutes, for example, may not engage in direct instruction of undergraduate students. A few, on the other hand, may *only* teach undergraduates. Still other institutes are set up solely for research and development, while others are directed toward public service. The contrast is between the open-ended, multifunctional mandate of departments and the typically restricted functions of institutes.

[2]Paul L. Dressel, F. C. Johnson, and P. M. Marcus, *The Confidence Crisis* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970).

The position of the academic department within the organizational structure is reasonably predictable. Colleges or schools are composed of departments and the dean of the college usually reports directly to the central administrative structure of the university. No such uniformity is characteristic of institutes. They may be organized within departments or colleges; they may report to an intermediate academic administrative officer; or they may be accountable directly to the president. The larger an institute, the more likely it is to float to the top of the institutional hierarchy.

Another significant difference between departments and institutes is the nature of their leadership. A mature academic department in a strong university is usually led by a chairman, who, while exercising certain clear administrative responsibilities and prerogatives, nonetheless tends to be a covener of the faculty, one who presides over departmental deliberations. The strong academic leader who shapes the department to conform with his own convictions and interests is the exception. Institutes, by contrast, have directors. Although they must be sensitive to the needs of professional personnel, including the need for basic academic freedoms and for adherence to a few generally accepted professional prerogatives, the distinction between the titles of chairman and director reflects real differences in role. Directors often directly shape goals and programs. Without an a priori disciplinary definition of unity, the director must state and restate the purposes of the institute if he is to build a viable organizational identity and maintain a reasonable sense of purpose.

Institutes and centers are low men on the totem pole of power and status. Their power derives almost totally from an ability to provide access to research resources. There is no monopoly on this commodity, however, and in many institutions the great bulk of research support is channeled through the departmental and college structure. Nonetheless, for faculty members holding membership in both camps, affiliation with an institute can increase availability of resources.

The final distinction between institutes and departments relates to organizational and budgetary stability. The department tends to have a stable organization and its budget grows incrementally. Although growth in any given year may be minuscule, large fluctuations up or down are not common. The institute budget usually depends on

external fund sources, and the size changes frequently. One year the director may be frantic in his search for staff; in another, he may be struggling to deal with an oversupply. Little wonder that faculty members in search of security and stability seek shelter in the academic department.

In short, institutes are different from departments and present a genuine organizational alternative. Whether they are considered to be positive additions to the structure depends on assumptions about fundamental purposes. If one understands the university to be functional, if not utilitarian, in character, institutes do add a useful dimension.

Institutes and Departments

University administrators and institute directors were asked to respond to a series of fifteen statements that set forth potential advantages of institutes. Their responses are shown in Table 8 in three major categories: statements which administrators and directors agreed were true; statements about which they did not agree with each other; and statements which both discounted or rejected as alleged advantages.

Directors and administrators—most of whom were academic or research vice-presidents or graduate deans—clearly agreed that institutes enable the university to establish new goals and respond to new constituencies more readily than do departments. Ninety percent of the directors and 94 percent of the administrators rated this advantage as a significant functional difference, suggesting that it is easier at times to influence the direction of university activities by creating new offices, bureaus, centers, and programs than by changing the goals, programs, and personnel of existing departments.

Closely related was the general agreement that institutes make visible the university's commitment to a particular area of specialization in a manner not possible in the department. Nine out of ten administrators and directors believed this to be the case, which perhaps explains the use of institutes by some "emerging universities" to gain increased recognition and enhance institutional prestige. Although several administrators and directors judged that departments are capable of emphasizing applied, public service, or problem-oriented research, approximately two-thirds of both groups ranked this capacity as an important advantage of institutes.

TABLE 8

COMPARISONS OF ACADEMIC DEPARTMENTS AND INSTITUTES BY UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATORS AND INSTITUTE DIRECTORS

Questions	Percentage in Agreement	
	University Administrators	Institute Directors
Areas of Agreement		
1. Enable the university to establish new goals and respond to new constituencies more readily.	94	90
2. Make visible the university's commitment to a particular area of specialization.	89	89
3. Assemble interdisciplinary teams of faculty researchers more easily.	98	88
4. Generate financial support for the university's research function.	72	82
5. Allow a greater emphasis on applied, public service or problem-oriented research.	63	67
6. Allow a more rapid shift of university resources to meet new institutional responsibilities.	70	74
7. Allow for temporary restructuring of the university.	87	74
Areas of Difference		
8. Allow faculty members to pursue their careers in an optimum manner.	41	63
9. Allow more effective fiscal and management control of research programs.	33	57
10. Make available specialized personnel such as computer specialists and others.	41	53
11. Free faculty from the day to day schedule demands of teaching and committee assignments.	39	50
Areas of Joint Disagreement		
12. Provide better career advancement opportunities for younger staff members.	2	19
13. Assemble more and better research equipment.	33	50
14. Provide greater freedom for staff members to pursue their personal research interests.	41	50
15. Enable appraisal of junior staff members for possible subsequent tenured appointment to the faculty.	7	19

Also high on the list of agreements was the utility of institutes in assembling interdisciplinary teams. All but one administrator ranked this ability as an important advantage, and the great majority of directors agreed. Although the extent of interdisciplinary collaboration in institutes is sometimes exaggerated and not without problems, the difficulty of achieving significant collaboration within the conventional departmental structure makes the latter alternative even more remote.

Financial considerations were reflected in the belief shared by administrators (72 percent) and directors (82 percent) that institutes generate financial support for the university's research function which could not be generated by departments. There was the related belief, likely supportable by fact, that external sponsors, especially governments and foundations, are principally interested in funding problem-solving, task-oriented research. To the extent that these beliefs are substantiated, institutes should be in a position to attract grants and contracts which might otherwise be unavailable to the university.

Related to the area of management and finance was the general agreement that institutes more than departments allow a rapid shift of resources to meet new institutional responsibilities. This view was reinforced by the belief (reported earlier) that appointments to institutes are temporary. Also related are policies which prevent institutes from awarding tenure and which favor project-by-project funding rather than general institutional allocations as the principal means of support. Eighty-seven per cent of the administrators and nearly three-quarters of the directors also agreed that institutes enable temporary restructuring of the university in ways not possible in departments.

As might be expected, administrators and directors did not always see advantages and disadvantages alike. Directors believed their organizations to be superior in areas not necessarily endorsed by central administrators. Areas of general agreement seemed to swell on the usefulness of institutes in shifting the goals as well as the resources of the university. Disagreements concentrated on the professional career advantages and disadvantages offered by institutes.

Institute directors thought, two to one, that institutes allow faculty members to pursue their careers in an optimum manner usually not possible within departments. About half of the directors claimed

that a significant advantage of institutes is their ability to free faculty from the day-to-day schedule demands of teaching and committee assignments. Administrators tended to disagree on both counts. Nearly 60 percent of the administrators implied that an institute is not necessarily an optimum spot for faculty members to pursue their careers, and essentially the same proportion refused to accept the view that institutes are able to free faculty from teaching and committee assignments to a greater degree than departments can.

The difference in views may stem from the different roles and institutional perspectives of the two groups. Obviously, the personal career choices of institute directors suggest that at least for them institutes met certain career needs that were not satisfied as fully in the conventional departmental structure. University administrators, on the other hand, having observed the very considerable growth in departmental power and autonomy, as well as the increase in faculty perquisites, status, and autonomy during the last decade, may have viewed the department as a nearly ideal spot from which to pursue a satisfying career.

Two additional areas of disagreement emerged. The first, relatively unimportant, is concerned with specialized personnel. Fifty-three percent of the directors thought institutes made available specialized personnel such as computer specialists and other professionals difficult to employ in academic departments. Only 41 percent of the administrators agreed, perhaps acknowledging that many departments do, in fact, employ specialized support personnel. The second area of disagreement was also probably related to different roles and perspectives: Two-thirds of the administrators rejected the view that institutes necessarily enable more effective fiscal and management control of research programs; but a majority of the institute directors, 57 percent, felt that such control is stronger in institutes. In fact, performance controls and fiscal accountability to grantors may well be stronger in many institutes than in the typical academic department. The bureaucracy of the institute may be more conscious of mission, deadlines, budgets, and full reporting than most departments are. Questions of management control, on the other hand, can take several perspectives. University administrators could have had in view the direct relationships between institutes and their external sponsors and the sometimes weakened central administrative controls that result.

The judgments of university administrators and institute directors, however, were more likely to coincide than to differ. Both groups essentially rejected significant functional advantages for institutes in four areas. Four out of five directors and 98 percent of the administrators rejected the assertion that "research centers and institutes provide better career advancement opportunities for younger staff members than do academic departments." One reason for this opinion is suggested by the general agreement that institutes do not enable "appraisal of junior staff members for possible subsequent tenured appointment to the faculty more effectively than do academic departments." More than 80 percent of the directors and more than 90 percent of the administrators discounted tenure appraisal as an advantage. The career attractiveness of institutes is also diminished by their inability to control the reward structure, grant professorial rank, give promotions, award tenure, and provide other academic perquisites. Faculty members need to establish themselves in their discipline, especially if rewards are controlled by the discipline, so under existing arrangements younger scholars may need to be cautious in their affiliations with institutes.

Finally, directors and administrators agreed that institutes and centers do not necessarily assemble more and better research equipment than departments nor do they necessarily provide greater freedom for staff members to pursue their personal research interests. In each case, only half the directors and less than half of the administrators would claim these qualities as an advantage of institutes. In the first instance, many institutes have very little research equipment of their own but tend to rely on the laboratories and equipment of departments and of the university as a whole. In the second, freedom to pursue personal research interests can be greater in departments than in institutes, despite the very practical limitations placed on availability of research resources in departments. The compromise in institutes, in many instances, involves an adaptation in research interests in return for increased time and resources for research.

Overall, administrators and directors were in substantial agreement about the functional advantages and disadvantages of institutes. These units are found to be valuable primarily because they focus on tasks rather than disciplines and they increase flexibility, enabling the university to shift its resources and to adapt its structure to serve new

goals and new constituencies. The advantages of this increased responsiveness are obvious. Its disadvantages, although less obvious, tend to follow the same dimensions. Flexibility creates instability. Recasting priorities, resources, and organizational structure increases conflict. And responsiveness to new goals and constituencies may modify institutional character and purposes in unintended directions. Certain disadvantages, such as instability, may be inherent in the institute model, but others, such as goal displacement, may reflect inadequate management control in complex universities. The principal point at issue is whether the institute model can or should be applied more generally in American higher education and, if so, how its liabilities can be minimized and its assets developed and exploited.

Controversy and Criticism

Institutes have generated criticisms and complaints far out of proportion to their numbers. One recent critic observed: "On a rough guess, I should think at least 75 percent of all existing institutes, centers and bureaus in the academic sphere of the university should be phased out."[3] Many observers believe that institutes not only fail to make a positive contribution but are the chief culprits in an alleged prostitution of the purposes of the American university. One of the most common complaints is that institutes, with their programs of sponsored research and public service, have undermined teaching. Nesbet suggests a need to clear the scene. "There cannot be any honoring of teaching so long as there is left in existence the whole, vast structure of research-dominated—especially large-scale, research-dominated—institutes and centers that tower above all else in the university today. . . . Until this thick overgrowth is cleared, it is difficult to see how the function of teaching can again become an honored one on the American campus."[4]

A corollary charge is that institutes have weakened the department by syphoning off the time, loyalties, and talents of faculty which would otherwise be wholly devoted to its work. Moreover, conflict can result from a dual system of rewards in which departmental faculty members with appointments in an institute appear to receive disproportionate support for research and scholarly activity while faculty members employed only in the department not only are left with less support for research but believe they carry heavier teaching loads as part of the bargain.

[3]R. Nesbet, *The Degradation of the American Dogma: The University in America, 1945-1970* (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

[4]Ibid., pp. 224-25.

Some of the bitterest critics say institutes have weakened the authority structure in the university. The principal offender here is the joint appointment, an alleged fragmentation of faculty effort in two or more units, and the accompanying problems of coordination, community, and equity. Faculty members employed jointly in institutes and departments sometimes receive perquisites not available to their colleagues employed solely in the department or solely in the institute. A favor denied in one quarter sometimes is granted in another. Judgments by chairmen and directors on salary increases, promotion, tenure, and merit can differ. The fundamental fear expressed by some is that institutes weaken the authority of the department chairman and the senior members of the faculty, and, in so doing, weaken the authority of the university to exert necessary controls on a wide range of crucial personnel matters.

Those concerned with tidiness in the academic community criticize institutes and centers for their apparent fragmentation of the structure. Complex as the typical university may be with as many as a hundred or more academic departments distributed among a dozen or more colleges, the introduction of thirty, forty, or perhaps as many as one hundred institutes distributed at random throughout the hierarchy further contributes to the sense of disorganization. Added to this is the confusion introduced by lack of standardized terms such as institute, center, bureau, and so forth. By and large, the distinctions and usage are inconsistent and arbitrary.

One of the most basic criticisms is the rejection of the purposes institutes and centers have been created to serve. Many within the academic community do not accept their functions as appropriate to the mission of the university. A related factor is the alleged introduction of a "knowledge for profit" motive. Jacques Barzun, in his statement on *The American University*, describes the academic rat race:

> The scholar, almost in proportion to his capacity for juggling claims, soon realizes that he must exert himself harder and harder to maintain the same output. Such is the natural result of modern communications: as consultant to one firm, he attracts the notice of three others, which write him alluring offers. In Washington, his success with one project leads to his becoming a referee on others; within the profession, his discoveries suggest that a group of fellow workers should start a new journal. He must be the editor

> and see whether it cannot be housed in his university. Meanwhile, right there at home and unknown to him, notable men in different disciplines have come to the conclusion that the world requires the immediate study of a neglected subject—say, the social impact of science. Nothing less than a new institute will accomplish this, as the work is interdisciplinary. Our man is approached, he is interested, he has connections. Before he knows it, he is writing prospectuses, haggling with the university office of projects and grants about proposed budgets, sitting through meetings where the word *angle* in the first draft is thoughtfully changed to *approach* and back again.[5]

This kind of opportunistic orientation to the academic marketplace, the searching after grants, the lending of oneself to the highest bidder—these are the qualities to which many object and for which they hold institutes responsible. Scholarship for profit, it is alleged, has debased university purposes and contributed substantially to the confidence crisis and confusion over purpose in which many universities now find themselves.

Criticisms of institutes are numerous and persistent. Some critics see the university in a purist state, unrelated to functional, utilitarian, or societal purposes. Others wish to turn back the clock, to bring back the more tranquil good old days when times were simpler and purposes more circumscribed. Still others seek the ideal university, and for many who seek this ideal higher education institution, institutes would not be part of their utopian design.

Critics often ignore the fact that the contemporary university has changed largely at the direction of the society that supports it and the academic men who run it. Although the teaching of undergraduate students was the principal purpose of most universities prior to World War II, they now carry on a wide array of functions that extend far beyond this initial conception. Charges that institutes have weakened academic departments are hard to take seriously in view of the astounding rise in power and influence of the department during the last two decades. While it may be true that institutes and centers have modified the power and authority structure, the redistribution has had positive as well as negative effects.

[5]Jacques Barzun, *The American University: How It Runs, Where It Is Going* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

Charges of a fragmented academic community, however, remain largely unanswered. Clearly, institutes are not well integrated with the university's organizational structure. On most campuses, institutes have grown rapidly, apart from the basic academic plan of the institution, and on a largely opportunistic and pragmatic basis; the result is a bewildering spider's network of organizational relationships. Though the lack of a grand design has made possible experimentation with new relationships and structures, the time may be at hand when most universities will want to draw from the best of their experiences and bring greater order in the development and management of institutes.

Coming to Grips with Issues

Both opponents and advocates agree that institutes often exist outside the central life of the university. Opponents see them as autonomous, opportunistic, and distorting basic university goals and purposes. Advocates, especially those involved in the day to day work, see institutes as isolated, disenfranchised, and exploited. Some of the conflict in views stems from a general lack of understanding of institutes as an alternative to the department, an alternative that should complement the department but neither mimic nor replace it.

At least five major issues must be resolved by colleges and universities as they attempt to integrate institutes and centers more fully than they have been. First, and clearly the most important of these issues, is the relationship between the goals and purposes of the institute and university objectives. Numerous instances can be cited in which institute goals were at cross-purposes with those of the parent university. The mere existence of an external funding source and the excuse that "no university monies are involved" can no longer serve as an alibi. Classified research is only one aspect of this issue. Universities must periodically evaluate and appraise institute performance and devise some orderly mechanism for ensuring that its activities do indeed accord with broad institutional purposes. Moreover, the academic community at large and university administrators in particular must play a more active role than they presently do in shaping the goal structure of institutes to guard against the charge of goal displacement resulting from an overly opportunistic pursuit of external fund sources.

The appropriate placement of institutes in the organization must also be decided. The basic issue here, again, is who controls whom. Some universities have initiated programs to bring all institutes within colleges and departments. Others have moved in the opposite direction, removing all these units from control of academic departments and colleges. The fundamental question is which set of values will prevail. If institutes are placed within the departmental and college structure, one must expect that the fundamental values of the discipline or profession will eventually reign. If one separates institutes from the direct control of departments and colleges, appropriate systems of academic control, either within or analogous to those exercised on most campuses through university senates, must be constructed to ensure that these units are brought within the decision-making and control mechanisms of the institution.

The third major issue is the future of institutes and centers as scarce financial resources continue to decrease on many campuses. What will happen when the crunch comes? Will resources be taken away from departments and colleges to support sagging institute budgets? Are the limited new monies available to the institution to be channeled disproportionately to support those institutes in financial stress? And if these funds are not used to support institutes and centers, on what basis is this decision reached? If institutes are genuinely attuned to institutional goals and purposes, should they not share proportionately in available resources? Should not institutes be relieved of some of the necessity of living from hand to mouth from the academic marketplace? These questions, of course, are affected by the extent to which various constituencies, particularly state legislators and statewide coordinating boards, understand institute functions to be not only legitimate but necessary.

Many universities must also confront the issue of full legitimization of nonteaching functions as a component in university goals. Although many universities profess a triumvirate of purposes—teaching, research, and service—organizational structures have been designed principally to carry out the teaching function. Specifically, departments are best suited to instruct undergraduate and graduate majors and to carry out "departmental" research. If the university indeed does pursue three major objectives, what further refinement of the organizational structure is needed to accommodate the full range of purposes?

The final issue to be addressed is the present dual system of professional personnel policies applied to faculty members employed in academic departments and to those professionals employed only in institutes. Many good arguments can be heard in defense of the status quo, but the basic question remains: Which benefits, essential to those who labor in departments, are somehow not needed by those employed in institutes? Tenure, promotion, and other faculty personnel policies are under review at many universities, and such reexamination should inquire into the possibility of reducing the present inconsistencies and inequities.

The Trend Toward Government Financing of Higher Education Through Students: Can the Market Model Be Applied?*

Larry L. Leslie

Introduction: Emergence of a Trend

This paper deals with a topic having serious, if not grave, implications for higher education. A trend toward government funding of higher education through students ie emerging.[1] This trend, which proposes to apply the market model to higher education, is largely the work of well-meaning economists, persons possessing only the high motives of equalizing opportunity and improving efficiency in higher education. Their motives are so fine that less desirable, noneconomic outcomes have not received careful consideration.

No one appears to have asked whether the market model is compatible with the basic values of American higher education. I propose to do that in this paper. Since the question is directly one of values, the answers given here must also be value-laden to a greater degree than is normally the case in traditional scholarship.

Evidences of the Trend

First, what indications are there that a trend toward student vouchers exists? There appear to be four important indicators. Two

*Originally CSHE Report No. 19, January 1973.

[1]The term "student voucher" will be used instead of the more cumbersome phrase "funding higher education through students." Although some would maintain that "student voucher" is a term that unnecessarily raises emotional reactio s, it seems accurate and proper here. Awarding grants to students who are allowed to select their college fulfills the normal definition of the voucher. It matters little whether the award is made by the institution or some external agency such as the federal government if, as is often the case, the student knows the award can be taken to any institution he or she may choose.

I am excluding traditional forms of student scholarships. This paper speaks strictly to the present trend toward governmental provision of funds to students *solely on the basis of need.* These funds are commonly called need-based grants or equal opportunity grants, which students can take with them to almost any postsecondary institution they might choose.

of these are the reports of two of the more significant national higher education study groups: the Carnegie Commission and the HEW (Newman) Task Force. More than any other forces, the recommendations of these two groups have resulted in vastly increased state voucher programs and in the federal Higher Education Bill of 1972,[2] which is essentially a national plan for a voucher system. These are the four major indicators: two are committee reports and two are specific, concrete actions. All four are closely related; indeed, the concrete actions may be direct results of the committee reports.[3]

The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education probably has done more to set higher education policy than any group in the last thirty or forty years. Most observers would agree that the soundness of the Commission's reports, coupled with the prestige of its members, has led to ready adoption of Commission recommendations by federal and many state governments. Thus, when in *Quality and Equality: Revised Recommendations, New Levels of Federal Responsibility*, the Commission listed as its overriding priority the achievement of equality of educational opportunity, the basic direction of Commission and, ultimately, of governmental policy was set. That this priority might be realized, the Commission made the following major recommendations to serve as guidelines for all future policy statements: "The three interacting elements of the proposed federal aid program to remove financial barriers are all of great importance: financial aid to students, with a substantial component of grants for low-income students and a moderately expanded loan program primarily for middle-income students; cost-of-education supplements to institutions; and creation of new places to accommodate all qualified students."[4] More specifically, the Commission recommended for undergraduates a $1,000 per year opportunity grant to be based solely on need. But the Commission did not stop with a policy for determining the nature of federal student grants. It went on to attempt to set the nature of

[2]The Education Amendments of 1972.

[3]Perhaps the importance of these study groups is overstated. I do not believe this to be the case. If I am wrong, the similarity of the Education Amendments to the Carnegie recommendations is a truly remarkable coincidence.

[4]Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *Quality and Equality: Revised Recommendations, New Levels of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 2.

state support: "To encourage commitment of more funds from nonfederal sources . . . the Commission recommends that an undergraduate student holding an educational opportunity grant and receiving added grants from nonfederal sources be given a supplementary federal grant in an amount matching the nonfederal grant."[5] Thus, state governments were "encouraged" to follow the voucher mode.

Federal grants to institutions were likewise to be tied to student grants. The Commission began: "To encourage colleges to participate more fully in the move toward equality of educational opportunity . . . the Commission recommends that the federal government grant cost-of-education supplements to colleges and universities based on the number and levels of students holding federal grants enrolled in the institutions."[6]

The only other federal funds to be awarded institutions would be construction grants and special purpose grants, such as aid for developing institutions, for libraries, and for international studies and research. Without question, the Carnegie Commission called for drastic revisions in the method of financing higher education.

The Newman Report, issued in March 1971, made the following parallel statement: "We also recommend that both the state and federal governments provide funds to institutions (both public and private) in the form of grants that accompany certain categories of students. . . . Providing funding through grants accompanying students (portable grants) has the advantage of encouraging a sense of competition and willingness to change as society changes."[7] It is important for future reference to note that the Task Force went on to comment: "There is little chance that such grants would encourage colleges to excessive catering to the whims of students. *There will continue to be more students than places,* so that most colleges will continue in a

[5]Ibid., p. 6.

[6]Ibid., p. 21.

[7]U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *Report on Higher Education* (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 74.

seller's market."[8] This, plus a recommendation for some categorical grants for innovative programs, is the essence of the Newman Task Force funding recommendations.

It is clear from the nature of and even the specific wording of the Higher Education Bill of 1972 that the Carnegie Commission, and to a lesser extent the Newman Task Force, provided the bases for the present federal legislation. Although the enabling legislation is at the time of this writing without appropriations, plans for federal funding of higher education will take the following form: for direct grants to students, there will be an extension of the present supplemental educational opportunity grant program for four more years with the maximum amount per year raised from $1,000 to $1,500. In addition, there will be basic educational opportunity grants in the amount of $1,400 minus family contributions.[9]

Direct grants to institutions will take the following form: 45 percent of such grants will be awarded on the basis of dollars received by the institution for Educational Opportunity Grants (EOG), work-study grants, and National Defense Student Loans; 45 percent on the basis of the number of entitlement awards at the institution; and 10 percent on the basis of the number of graduate students enrolled. Thus, 90 percent of the allocation would be tied strictly to student vouchers, whether loans or grants.

The only direct institutional support not tied to student grants will be $200 for each FTE (full-time equivalent) post-baccalaureate student. Forty million dollars will also be available over a two-year period for emergency support of institutions on the verge of bankruptcy. There will be funds for the development of community colleges.

[8]Ibid.; italics mine.

[9]Public Law 92-318, The Education Amendments of 1972. *Note:* In all these programs, there are varying funding thresholds so that the amount available to any given program depends in some way upon the amount available for other programs. See the specific wording for elaboration.

But of special interest and importance—and we shall return to this later—is a regulation which would cause federal matching of state funds in order to increase state appropriations for student scholarships based on need. The implications of this are worth considering. Traditionally, the bulk of state appropriations have been unstipulated block grants to institutions. Regulations had to be followed, of course, but the institution had wide flexibility in the internal allocation of resources. Under this bill, states would be enticed to diminish general institutional support in favor of student vouchers. This carrot before the legislative mule could cause states to reduce unstipulated funding. Although the initial appropriation for this program is only $50 million per year, "Such sums as may be necessary" are authorized for continuation grants. This influence on state funding is especially interesting in light of the advertised advantage of student vouchers: that the federal government would cause less interference in state funding patterns.[10]

It is certainly true that the magnitude of federal support for higher education is small in comparison to the size of state support. Nevertheless, it is quite clear that under these amendments the federal government will play a large part in determining the nature of state government funding. Further, its influence comes at a moment when the portion of state monies already being channeled through student vouchers is quite sizable and is increasing sharply. In 1967-68, six states had state scholarship or grant programs; in 1971-72, the number was twenty-two. Since 1969, the average percentage increase in state funds for these programs has been up 18 percent each year. Although the average award rose only gradually during the past three years, the number of separate awards increased greatly, being up 14 percent in

[10]There is serious disagreement among the "experts" on this point of institutional autonomy. Proponents of the voucher insist that more, not less, autonomy would result because institutions would be freed of many governmental regulations. Students, not governments, would be providing the funds and making the demands. As discussed later, there is also much to be said in rebuttal of this position because a market system is essentially a stimulus-response system in which producers respond to consumers in a very closely related fashion.

1970-71 and 19 percent in 1971-72.[11] By synthesizing and extrapolating from scattered data, it is estimated that approximately $300 million are now spent on student scholarships and grants by states. In 1970, the federal government added another $930 million; private sources contributed $50 million; and colleges and universities from their own varied sources added $700 million.[12]

Clearly, a trend toward government financing of higher education through students exists. The trend appears to be a major one only now in its beginning phases.

Reasons for the Trend

Why has the trend occurred? What do the causes of the trend tell us about its likely effects?

Although there are a host of listed purposes to be served by student vouchers, all may be subsumed under two general headings. The first is the purpose of equalizing educational opportunity, and the second is the perceived need to respond to the current financial crisis in higher education. Actually, the two are closely related. Those who argue for equality of educational opportunity realize they do so in a period of financial retrenchment. Thus, they believe it to be good politics (nonpejoratively speaking) to point out the efficiencies possible through invoking market conditions upon higher education via student vouchers. Concomitantly, those largely concerned about the financial crisis point out not only the possible economies to be gained by invoking market conditions through vouchers, but also the equality of educational opportunity that may result.

It is not necessary to detail either the existence of a financial crisis or the present inequality of higher educational opportunity. The

[11] In five states, awards are not based solely on need, but are generally competitive. Further, in only nine of the remaining seventeen states were all or virtually all awards purely need based. These data are taken from *"Inventory of Student Financial Aid Programs, Phase I Report,"* ED058039 (Washington, D. C.: ERIC, 1971), and 1971-72, pp. 6-16; and Joseph Boyd, *Comprehensive State Scholarship Grant Programs—Third Annual Survey* (Deerfield, Illinois: Illinois State Scholarship Commission, 1971).

[12] Ibid.

Carnegie Commission, the Association of American Colleges, and the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges have conducted studies demonstrating that such a crisis exists.[13] It should be likewise unnecessary to list the overwhelming evidence in support of the second assumption. The reader need only be reminded that at all ability levels, the percentage of individuals attending college from higher socioeconomic backgrounds is two or three times greater than the percentage of those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.[14]

All of this seems simple and straightforward enough unless one asks the question: Why can equality of educational opportunity only be realized through the student voucher? The presumed advantages of student vouchers, efficiency-wise, seem clear enough upon noting that such advantages all follow from the notion of a competitive marketplace. However, one might well ask why low-cost or zero tuition, coupled perhaps with cost-of-living grants to low-income youth, would not result in comparable equality. The answer is that such a plan probably would have comparable effects; but there is another consideration which is tacitly understood but seldom discussed among parties to the debate. This consideration is simply that the total resource pool of funds available to higher education is not expected to expand significantly in the near future. Therefore, funds expended to meet one priority will be spent at the cost of another, although, of course, priorities may overlap. The majority of public subsidies in the form of low tuitions spread among all students are funds denied the needy, for only the needy may receive funds under the competing voucher system. This is why, under the constraints of the amount of funds presently available, high- or full-cost tuition is always either a visible or hidden attribute of voucher plans: there simply are not enough resources to afford low tuition plus large amounts for grants to needy students. Furthermore, as those opposed to vouchers recognize, vouch-

[13]Earl F. Cheit, *The New Depression in Higher Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971); William W. Jellema, "The Red and the Black," and "Redder and Much Redder" (Washington, D. C.: The Association of American Colleges, 1971); Garvin Hudgins and Ione Phillips, *Public Colleges in Trouble: A Financial Profile of the Nation's State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges* (Washington, D. C.: NASULGC, 1971).

[14]Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *New Students and New Places* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971); pp. 26-29. Project Talent is another, more complete source.

ers are at a cost to general purpose grants to institutions.[15] If this were not so, there would be little conflict about the voucher plan since both sides agree that equalization of opportunity is the major priority. But the opponents of the voucher approach insist that equality is only one priority for higher education, albeit probably the most important one.

Complicating these circumstances is the particularly desperate condition of the private colleges, a condition which it is assumed the voucher would alleviate through the introduction of meaningful public-private competition. Without question, a redressing of the current competitive imbalance between private and public institutions demands immediate attention: the financial condition of private colleges is such that unless this imbalance is corrected, many will not survive. With full-cost tuition applied to the public institutions, the competitive position of the private schools would appear to be improved enormously, although the impact upon those who pay tuition at public institutions would also be substantial.

In sum, the student voucher mode was created in response to the need for the extension of educational opportunity and the perceived need to gain efficiency in higher education through application of market conditions. As an outgrowth of the attempt to satisfy market conditions and from the need to reallocate limited resources in response to this and the opportunity priorities, it is generally recognized that tuitions must approach full cost.

Effects of the Trend

This brings us to the third and perhaps decisive portion of this statement. What will be the effects on higher education of the trend toward financing higher education through student vouchers? The amount of speculation on this question is extraordinary.

[15]Perhaps they also question the fairness of requiring middle- and even high-income individuals to support, through their taxes, the *free* college education of students from low-income homes while they must bear the full cost of educating their own children.

The assumptions that the voucher will extent opportunity and especially that it will improve efficiency are such speculations.[16] On the first point, there appears to be little disagreement; however, on the second, there is vigorous debate and therein lies the crux of this paper. Can we assume the voucher will improve efficiency? Voucher proponents assume that the voucher will invoke a market model and that certain specific outcomes related to efficiency will result. Clearly, this is what the student voucher advocates imply when they speak of "gaining efficiency through competition among institutions" and "causing higher education to be more responsive to students and to the taxpayers." Before proceeding, it is important to note that arguments for voucher plans do not necessarily rely upon meeting market conditions. Equality of opportunity, for example, can most surely be promoted via vouchers without any reference to the marketplace. But this paper seeks to examine, from theory, what the total effects of a voucher plan might be. The applicable theory is that of the free market, or the market model.

The point raised in question is whether higher education can be a marketplace, i.e., whether students can fulfill the role of consumers and institutions the role of producers and vendors of goods or services.

Description of the Model

For the answers to these questions, let us examine the model. The market model, when reduced to its simplest elements, consists of consumers and producers who are brought together in a general market system. There may be many middlemen, but at its simplest level there are only consumers and producers and the general market system. For efficient market operation, each of these elements must consist of the following.

[16]There is little hard evidence that higher education is really inefficient. The financial crisis appears to have promoted that assumption. It is true that one can spot areas of mismanagement in higher education as in any institution. It is also true that there have been practically no productivity gains in higher education in several decades. Part of the explanation, however, is that, like any service "industry," higher education is labor intensive, and productivity gains are very difficult to achieve.

Consumers must be characterized by: (1) the ability to make prudent choices; (2) the knowledge necessary to make these choices; and (3) the means to exercise these choices.

Producers of goods or services—or rather their organizations—must be characterized by: (1) a single decision maker; (2) a profit motive; (3) a technology by which a particular output is produced using land, labor, and capital outputs; (4) the freedom to sell outputs in order to earn revenues; and (5) the freedom to use revenues to buy productive factors.[17]

The general market system must be characterized by perfect competition, increasing costs in all industries, an exclusion property, the absence of public goods (benefits), complete knowledge, and complete mobility.[18]

Before turning to the analysis, a qualifying statement is in order. First, the market model as defined here is an abstract ideal that does not exist in reality. There are no perfect marketplaces. Second, there is clearly room for improved efficiency in higher education and certain market conditions applied in selected settings would no doubt be a good thing. Within subunits of colleges and universities, such as purchasing offices or academic departments, the introduction of certain market conditions might very well result in efficiency gains. However, whether higher education as a total institution can or should be treated like a business organization is another question.

Can Students Be Consumers?

Do students, then, fit the role of marketplace consumer? The simple answer would appear to be a rather clear "no." Notwithstanding such efforts as those by Henry Levin to compare higher education consumers to the discriminating parents of San Francisco Bay Area preschool children and by Robert Hartman to show that within an insti-

[17] Robert Henry Haveman, *The Economics of the Public Sector* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970), p. 20.

[18] Ibid., pp. 23-27.

tution students make rational choices in selecting program majors, the evidence is quite strong that in the selection of colleges and universities students do not generally make rational, informed decisions.[19]

Direct evidence concerning the college student in the role of consumer is provided in a vast literature on this topic. The first conclusion from this literature is that geography continues to be the primary predictor of whether a student will go to college and specifically which college he will attend.[20] The principal reasons for this are probably emotional and financial, with the desire to live at home being perhaps the major underlying factor. In any case, if students act as wise consumers, they do so largely within the limits of geography.

The second set of conclusions, concerning the perceived needs of students and the extent to which institutional milieus complement those needs, comes from the works of George Stern and Robert Pace and to a lesser extent from Alexander Astin and Burton Clark. Utilizing such instruments as the College and University Environment Scales, the Activities Index, and the College Characteristics Index to examine needs and presses, these researchers have reached conclusions about "student needs" and "institutional presses."

According to George Stern, "The relationship of student needs to the institutional press (environment) for the same students (data are from a variety of institutions) is not much stronger among institutions than within." In other words, student needs correlate about as well with the environmental press of other institutions as with their own institutions.[21] Stern also concludes: "There is no relationship

[19]From unpublished papers presented to the Task Force on Funding Higher Education, the Committee for Economic Development, New York City, 1972.

[20]There seems to be no exception to this conclusion in the literature. See, for example, Elizabeth Douvan and Carol Kaye, "Motivational Factors in College Entrance," *The American College*, ed. Nevitt Sanford (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962), pp. 193-223; and the citation of the works of Holland on National Merit Scholars, Ibid., p. 219.

[21]George G. Stern, "Environments for Learning," *The American College*, pp. 713-14.

between student characterizations of their needs and their characterizations of the institutional press."[22] This general pattern in Stern's findings is modified in one other writing where Stern indicates that students select colleges at least somewhat congruent with their personality needs.[23]

The other principal researcher in this area, Robert Pace, seems to have obtained more consistent results. From data obtained using his College and University Environment Scales, Pace shows that although students often intend to match their needs with their college choice, due to misinformation and misinterpretation, they seldom do. Pace notes that student expectations and idealizations of their institutions are nearly identical, but "neither were very similar to the actual profiles of the colleges which the students hoped to enter." Pace concludes that colleges select students a good deal more carefully than students select institutions, perhaps raising an interesting question as to just who is acting as consumer.[24]

On the other hand, Alexander Astin's comparable work is considerably more optimistic. Says Astin, "The characteristics of the entering student bodies are highly related to certain characteristics of colleges." Astin, however, suggests that the apparent inconsistency with Pace and Stern's findings may be simply explained. Astin's favored hypothesis is that over time colleges have simply adapted their curricula to fit the characteristics "of those students who mysteriously turn up."[25] In other words, students really do not make informed choices at all.

[22]George G. Stern, "Congruence and Dissonance in the Ecology of College Students," *Student Medicine* 5 (April 1960): 304-39.

[23]George G. Stern, "The Intellectual Climate in College Environments," *The College Student and His Culture: An Analysis*, ed. Kaoru Yamamoto (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968), p. 207.

[24]C. Robert Pace, "Diversity of College Environments," *National Association of Women Deans and Counselors Journal* 25 (October 1961): 21-26; idem., "When Students Judge Their College," *College Board Review* 58 (Winter 1965-66).

[25]Alexander W. Astin, "Who Goes Where to College?," *The College Student and His Culture*, ed. Kaoru Yamamoto, pp. 146-147; 158.

Other apparently conflicting findings emerge from the works of Burton Clark, who studied "distinctive" colleges. At first appearing to contradict himself, Clark states: "The influence of a college, broadly speaking, includes the attracting of a particular student body out of a large pool of students. Students make themselves available to a college according to their impressions of it." He goes on to say, "Many students go to a college or university with hardly any image of it at all." The explanation is that the first statement is based largely upon research done on distinctive institutions such as Antioch, Reed, San Francisco State, and Swarthmore, whereas the second quote is a more generic statement.[26] Clearly, schools like Reed and Antioch are distinctive institutions having a unique environment; their unusual environments are generally well known, especially among the kinds of students they attract. Thus, the institutional choice of these students represents deviation from the normal pattern formed by their less informed cohorts.

This conclusion is confirmed by the works of Douvan and Kaye, who state that "Students who are unconcerned about the geographic location of the school they chose, are undoubtedly from more sophisticated, cosmopolitan families."[27]

Very briefly, and in sum, the conclusions seem clear. First, geography is the major predictor of whether a student will go to college and which institution he will select. In fact, even religious preferences and parental alumni affiliations are better indicators than the sagacity of student choices.[28] Second, either because of a lack of information or perhaps because of misinterpretation, the vast majority of students are not able to match their needs with the environment of an institution, although there are exceptions, especially in the case of the sophisticated and those seeking distinctive institutions. However, the kinds of students who would be receiving student vouchers would be the least likely to fill the roles of informed consumers. Voucher students are not likely to be sophisticated, cosmopolitan, or urbane.

[26]Burton R. Clark, "College Image and Student Selection," pp. 179; 188.

[27]Douvan and Kaye, "Motivational Factors," p. 220.

[28]Ibid., p. 221.

Thus, students appear to be severely limited as consumers, even considering liberal criteria. But under the market model, the criterion is a good deal more limited. The explicit question is whether students can judge which institutions will yield the highest economic return. It is not as simple as selecting a college with high prestige or one which has a compatible environment; it is selecting for purposes of optimizing an educational investment. One might wonder if even the sophisticated and cosmopolitan are capable of this. One hundred miles beyond the Ivy League domain, such sophistication is seldom found.

Perhaps it could be argued that students come as close to filling the market roles as do consumers in making their daily purchases.[29] If this is so, the validity of the market model as a concept must be called into question.

Can Higher Education Be a Producer–Vendor?

The second major element of the model is the organization of the producer-vendor. There are several specific required characteristics of this organization, only some of which will be discussed here.

The first is the requisite for a single decision maker—a condition not well met in institutions of higher education. Presumably, the requirement is only for a final decision-making authority; but, even in this, final decision making in higher education operates under the principle of shared authority. The president or the board have final functional authority in some matters, the faculty in others, and the students yet in others; but, in almost all cases, functional authority is shared by all or several of the parties.

Second is the profit motive. With the exception of proprietary schools, there is no such motive in higher education. Indeed, higher education has sometimes been characterized as most closely fitting the model of the nonprofit organization. In fact, until a recent court case called the policy into question, all of the regional accrediting associations demanded the absence of a profit motive as a prerequisite condition for accreditation. Incidentally, another essential ingredient of a

[29]This is an appropriate juncture to reiterate that the market model is no more than an unattainable theoretical concept. The question here, however, is the *degree* of applicability of the model to higher education.

market system--competition--is said to exist only because of the profit motive.[30] Markets can exist without the presence of a profit motive, but efficiency is best served under a profit system. As an illustration, profit is the motive for risking the development of a new product. Thus, how can we expect strong leadership for new and innovative programs in the absence of profit? To be sure, we can provide incentives in the form of promotions and higher salaries, although this possibility diminishes as the day of the union approaches. Would the union allow professors to be paid bonuses on some production basis such as the number of students they recruit for their classes?

The kind of competition that exists in higher education is not the traditional variety. Institutions compete for legislative favor, seeking to gain resources for the achievement of institutional goals. They compete for prestigious faculty and for students. Viewed in this light, it is perhaps correct to conclude that there is a kind of higher education profit. If so, that profit must be largely a form of psychic profit enjoyed by administrators who gain power through larger enrollments and budgets and by faculty members who enjoy the added prestige related to large size and the institutional quality afforded by extra resources.

The third essential characteristic of the seller's organization is a technology by which a particular output is produced from certain inputs. But what is the output of higher education, particularly of the university? Without identifying an output, the economic model cannot be applied and an analysis made. Economists have specified a variety of instructional units, such as the number of degrees granted, the number of full-time equivalent students enrolled, or the number of student credit hours generated, as the output of higher education. Yet, volumes have been written in testimony to the shortcomings of these measures, the greatest flaw being that they do not consider quality. Further, instruction is only one of the three purposes of higher education: instruction, research, and service; therefore, an economic analysis based only upon instruction would be spurious especially because it is extraordinarily difficult to separate instruction and research for purposes of analysis. Indeed, this is why college budgets use the combined category of "Instruction and Departmental Research."

[30]Rudolph W. Trenton, *Basic Economics* (New York: Meredith Publishing Company, 1964), p. 23.

As to the fourth and fifth essential characteristics—the freedom to sell outputs and the freedom to use earned revenues—these could be afforded only under a proprietary system for only this system resembles a true marketplace. Governmental intervention necessarily accompanies public subsidies and all institutions that enroll voucher recipients must come under significant governmental regulations. Doubtless, even the advocates of the student voucher would argue for a proprietary system and few would deny the need for governmental regulation.

Can Higher Education Operate as a Market System?

The third general element in our analysis is the market system itself. The marketplace must be characterized by competition. But, as shown above, competition can only exist with a profit motive. Higher education is not characterized by a traditional kind of profit motive. Further, competition assumes reasonable consumer knowledge about products. As has been shown, student consumers, for the most part, do not make rational choices (in the psychological or economic sense). Part of the problem is the lack of knowledge about institutions, although an efficient dissemination system in the form of accessible audio and visual recordings has been in existence for at least ten years without noticeable effects upon student choices.

The second necessary condition for an effective market system, and the final one discussed here, is the exclusion property, which requires that all benefits from the purchased commodity be captured by the consumer. Higher education, however, has large spillover effects with society benefiting greatly in literally hundreds of ways from the higher education of individual citizens. These external benefits of higher education may be so large as to rival in size the returns to the individual.[31] Even Milton Friedman, one of the leading exponents of a free market system for higher education, acknowledges the substan-

[31] Larry L. Leslie, "Funding Higher Education: An Examination of Strategies" (Paper prepared for the Committee for Economic Development, July 1972).

tial spillover effects.[32] Of course, many products or services have spillover effects; but few products, if any, have spillover rivaling that of higher education.

Will the Model Help Private Institutions?

Private institutions often enter into the discussion at this point for two reasons: first, free market spokesmen presume certain efficneicies of the private sector over the public. Second, the desperate financial condition of many private colleges demand relief, and vouchers are presumed to offer that relief.

The Carnegie Commission's recent reports, *More Effective Use of Resources and Institutional Aid*, seem to argue the case, however unintentionally, for the superior efficiency of public higher education, thus bringing into question the presumption that private enterprise will be more efficient. The Commission notes that in almost any dimension, private higher education is more costly than public higher education. In 1967-68, private colleges enrolled only 30 percent of all students, but received almost 40 percent of current fund income.[33] Private school costs are also higher and these higher costs cannot be explained by examining basic differences between the two sectors, such as more graduate and fewer lower division students in the private sectors: costs per FTE tend to be higher even when educational level is controlled;[34] lower faculty-student ratios are part of the explanation.[35] Further, private school administrative costs are far higher even when we control for size.[36]

[32]Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 88.

[33]The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *Institutional Aid: Federal Support to Colleges and Universities* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 73.

[34]Costs here are defined as educational and general expenses, less organized research costs. See, The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *The More Effective Use of Resources* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 37.

[35]Ibid., p. 69.

[36]Ibid., p. 133.

In addition, costs are continuing to rise more sharply in the private institutions than in the public. From 1953-54 to 1966-67, private school costs rose 5.2 percent faster than the Consumer Price Index, while those in the public sector rose 2.5 percent. Part of the explanation was a more rapid rise in private school graduate enrollments and public sector community college enrollments.[37] Private institution income per student also rose more rapidly than public school income, causing the Carnegie Commission to comment that the private sector's competitive position, while superior ten years ago, had improved even more over the past decade and, thus, "Formulas which differentially favor private institutions require special justification in light of these facts."[38]

The federal voucher plan favors private institutions because small institutions, which are mostly private, receive more money per student; and students who select private colleges would tend to receive larger grants than would those selecting public colleges. Yet, not only are private schools, in general, less efficient, but small institutions, which are mostly private, are less efficient than somewhat larger ones.[39] These conclusions challenge the credibility of present voucher plans as models of efficiency. Further, the present federal voucher plan would encourage the less efficient smaller institution to remain small, because per student aid would be reduced with growth. Small colleges, given a choice between admitting a few voucher recipients at a higher income rate and admitting significant numbers at a reduced income rate, might well choose the former, especially if small institutional sizes were values highly.

On the credit side, vouchers would appear to be less prone than institutional grants to constitutional challenges to governmental support of private schools. Second, since general institutional support has previously gone only to public institutions, simple logic would suggest that if under the voucher plan students could for the first time select either public or private schools, some net flow of funds to the private sector would result.

[37]Ibid., p. 36.

[38]The Carnegie Commission, *Institutional Aid*, pp. 73-74.

[39]Larry L. Leslie, "The Issue of Institutional Size: A Case of Conflicting Views" (Paper prepared for the Committee for Economic Development, February 1972).

But which private institutions and to what extent they would benefit are perhaps the real issues. The elite private institutions are not, for the most part, experiencing financial difficulty; most have plenty of students who pay rather high tuitions. The small, rural, single sex, denominational institution is the one in dire economic straits. Yet, if we assume for the moment that the market-voucher advocates were right after all, it is possible to predict that, given a voucher, students would select the elite institutions. Such selection would probably be consistent with the market model assumption that consumers (students) would choose institutions yielding the highest economic return. On the other hand, if as forecast here, students would not act as marketplace consumers, we must rely for predictive purposes upon past and present trends. These trends predict no significant flow of students into the "nonelite" colleges.

The second issue concerns the amount of new funds obtained. The question is: Given a voucher, how many students who would otherwise have gone to public institutions would select the private institutions? Presently, there are no complete answers to these questions. However, preliminary investigations at the Center for the Study of Higher Education at The Pennsylvania State University reveal that these numbers may be quite small.[40]

There is yet another potential problem for private (as well as public) institutions anticipating fiscal salvation via vouchers. The federal Higher Education Act of 1972 stipulates that federal funds must be used solely "to defray instructional expenses in academically related programs," and that the institution "will expend during the academic year for such related programs, an amount equal to at least the average amount spent during the past three years." The interpretation of these regulations is that these additional monies will not be available to correct deficits but will be expended primarily, if not exclusively, for the needy students recruited. The admission of such students might very well exacerbate rather than alleviate the financial problems of small private institutions because of the greatly increased student services and expanded curricula demanded by low income

[40]Study of voucher recipients in five states to be completed late in 1973.

groups, particularly those of minority races.[41] Remedial courses, ethnic studies programs, additional counseling, and perhaps lower student-faculty ratios are some of the required costly procedures. The logic of seeking efficiency and at the same time requiring hundreds of additional colleges to establish such costly programs is an elusive concept.

Another edge of this already two-edged sword is the matter of institutional autonomy. Perhaps, to the institution on the brink of financial disaster, caveats about the risks to autonomy are not terribly germane. Nevertheless, many private institutions are not on the verge of bankruptcy, and these institutions should be aware of all the dangers of receiving public funds.

Although the student voucher advocates claim their plan would preserve institutional autonomies, evidence such as the following regulation from the Federal Act of 1972 calls this into question. To be eligible for aid based on graduate enrollments, an institution must "describe (its) general educational goals and specific objectives." This section of the bill clearly implies that the federal government will oversee institutional goals. But what is more basic to an institution's autonomy than its goals? Since passage of the Henderson Law, private institutions in New York State have already been ruled to be legally public institutions for certain purposes and, thus, subject to regulation because they receive funds based upon the number of degrees awarded.[42]

The wording of Russell Thackrey, Executive Director Emeritus of the National Association of Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, is most lucid on this question of private school autonomy. Says Thackrey, "The requirements of the federal constitution and laws, including the definition and title of the Civil Rights Act, and the responsibility of the state for accountability in the use of its funds, will sooner or later place all similarly financed institutions on the same basis of regu-

[41] Fr. Paul Reinert, President of St. Louis University, first made this observation.

[42] Robert M. O'Neill, "Law and Higher Education—In Imperfect Harmony" (Paper prepared for the Committee for Economic Development, pp. 37-39).

lation, supervision, and accountability. The idea that institutions can 'have it both ways' by channeling funds through the student rather than directly to the institution is, I believe, an illusion."[43]

There is yet a more straightforward way in which the student voucher will affect institutional autonomy, both in public and private institutions. The first thing learned by any graduate student in college and university administration is that he who controls the budget sets the goals. To this extent, the market model cannot be faulted. Students could have the power of consumers, no matter how wise their decisions. With vouchers in their hands, it is students who are going to pay the piper and it is they who will call the tune. Now, on the other hand, if this contention is in error (e.g., it has been argued that the G.I. "vouchers" of past World War II did not cause institutions to change their programs in meaningful ways), then the entire argument that institutions will respond as producers and dispensers of goods and services has no merit whatsoever. With this go many of the hoped for effects of the market model.

The power of the budget is clearly shown in our institutions. How does college leadership reorder institutional priorities? Is it not very largely through the redistribution of resources? This is perhaps the major principle of long- and short-range institutional planning. Goal targeting through shifting of resources is the planner's major instrument of change.

Conclusions

Can the market model apply? For the most part, it probably cannot. Higher education, at least as presently designed, does not sufficiently represent a marketplace. Should it apply? Again, it probably should not, although some of the theoretical outcomes of the market model would no doubt be desirable for higher education. It seems that institutions ought to be more responsive to society than they are, but only moderately so.

[43]Russel I. Thackrey, "Financing Higher Education Through a Voucher System: Recommendations of the Governor's Commission on Education in Wisconsin" (Paper presented to the American Association for Higher Education, March 1971), p. 7.

Limited Goals of Voucher System.

There are good reasons for this limited endorsement of the voucher system. The goals basic to student vouchers and the market model are worthy goals to be sure; but primarily they are only one kind of goal—economic. They seek to improve efficiency in higher education and to redistribute income through equalizing educational opportunity, both of which are economic goals at least in part. The former is targeted toward financial savings in higher education, and the latter is targeted toward the redistribution of personal income through equal opportunity (which is obviously a social as well as an economic goal). One cannot seriously disagree with these goals, nor perhaps even with their priority. But those who understand the full purposes of higher education in American society must emphatically insist that there are purposes apparently unknown to some economists, many of whom seem unaware of the nature of the university as an educational entity and of colleges and universities as social institutions. This narrow view is perhaps nowhere more clearly expressed than in Buchanan and Devletoglou's critical economic analysis of higher education, *Academia in Anarchy*. These economists refuse to recognize the need for considering the complex interactions of economic and social factors in higher education. They state: "'Academic Freedom' has genuine economic content, and the intense faculty defense of this freedom is predictable on grounds of very elementary economics. Whether or not this freedom is socially justifiable is another question, and one that we have no need to discuss in this book."[44] Such narrow viewpoints are perhaps to be expected from any group of social scientists who possess only the framework of their own disciplines for examination of social phenomena. The economists, perhaps more than any other group, force the institution undergoing analysis to adapt to the economic model, rather than adapting the analysis to the existing conditions of the institution. But all disciplines insist that theirs is the "proper" basis for analyzing higher education; none seem to realize that each discipline provides a valid, and often conflicting, model. Perhaps only the academic dilettante or the student of higher education per se can broadly understand the university. Total or near total funding of higher education through student vouchers may represent

[44]James M. Buchanan and Nicos E. Devletoglou, *Academic in Anarchy* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 60.

good economics but it represents poor "higher education." Those who truly understand higher education are aware that concepts such as academic freedom, diversity among institutions, and institutional autonomy go far beyond serving the self-interests of a few insolent, egocentric faculty and administrators. Nevertheless, those who do possess such insights would probably agree that more institutional accountability is a good thing.[45] They would simply hasten to warn that higher education has a terribly important function as social critic, a responsibility which can only be insured if institutions and faculty members are somewhat buffered from pressures for immediate response to every public pressure. A market system as the guiding framework for higher education would tend to exclude any activity not related to producing the goods or services being purchased. Evidence of this can be easily noted by reflecting on the nature of proprietary schools, which are the best existing examples of a market system in higher education. These schools appear to give no attention to matters lacking a direct, practical application. They have little place for esthetics and the fine arts for their own sake, for other elements of a liberal education, or for pure research. Nothing could be more antithetical to the idea of the university than the proprietary school.

Voucher System Imposes Federal Restrictions.

The Carnegie Commission's volume entitled *Institutional Aid* says: "Institutions in turn should be free to choose their students, without discrimination on grounds of race."[46] They go on to say that the autonomy of the institutions should be preserved. But is this really possible when a desperate institution can only find salvation through admitting students presented to them by federal or state governments?

The Commission also speaks out against "the development of a single national system of higher education."[47] Yet they favor federal

[45]The Carnegie Commission, for example, points out how college budgetary procedures tend to discourage innovation. See, The Carnegie Commission, *The More Effective Use of Resources*, pp. 107-108.

[46]The Carnegie Commission, *Institutional Aid*, p. 3.

[47]Ibid., p. 2.

pressures upon states to follow the federal funding pattern—student vouchers. The federal government, in the form of the Higher Education Act of 1972, has furthered this interference in state higher education affairs by demanding statewide planning and a State Higher Education Commission (even the composition of the commission is prescribed) before certain funds can be received.[48] The wisdom of these statewide activities is not debated, but the federal dictation to the states is properly noted.

Now it must be acknowledged that all this does not prove that the market model could not be applied to higher education, although it does seem to show that such would be most difficult under present conditions. Further, this analysis intimates that other social functions may be cast aside when a social institution is placed on a market system. Present criticisms of business and industry vis-à-vis the environment illustrate this caveat. Nevertheless, the temptation does exist to turn higher education completely upside down and shake it, so severe is present disillusionment with the system.

Similarly, under present arrangements, governmental regulations regarding higher education severely restrict the operation of a market model; however, perhaps under a fully emancipated free market system all elements of the model could operate as predicted from the theory.

Voucher System Creates a Limited Public Service

A final conclusion has to do with the politics of awarding vouchers only to the needy. Explicitly, would long-range losses in public support for higher education result from such a system?

The plan for full-cost or very high tuition is a significant departure from the tradition of making public services available to all and then letting the public exercise the options. This is illustrated by such public conveniences and services as highways, parks and playgrounds, and public libraries. On the other hand, parallels can also be drawn to the traditional exclusive use by the poor of certain public welfare programs. Indeed, an income test is usually required to be eligible for these programs. Finally, public elementary and secondary education,

[48]Community college aid and planning grants are the programs concerned.

the services closest in nature to those of higher education, follow yet another model in that, in essence, all persons up to a certain age are required to accept them; therefore, equality of opportunity is in a sense built into the system (although it is by no means achieved because dropout rates are much higher among the poor).

The difficulty is that one could argue for the application to higher education of any of these models. The values of the author of this paper are such that very low tuition, paid for by a strongly progressive tax system coupled with generous grants to low-income youth for cost-of-living and incidental expenses, is preferred. Contracts could be awarded to private colleges for the education of certain students. This position is based largely on a major experience in the California system and the view that the more politically popular public services have been those which have been equally available to all citizens. Consequently, services like fire protection, social security legislation, and educational benefits under the G.I. Bill have received broad public favor, whereas welfare programs, oil depletion allowances, and various other business tax advantages have caused widespread dissatisfaction. Thus, it would seem that continued support of higher education would be more likely, politically, with a single rather than double tax.[49] Further, many of these traditional social values of higher education can be promoted only if institutions have some unrestricted funds at their disposal. Promotion of these values, in addition to those of efficiency and equality of opportunity, clearly suggests an eclectic funding plan such as that described above.

In closing, it should be noted that "correct" decisions in social organizations are not matters of good economics or bad. As Abraham Maslow noted, all the social sciences, unlike the physical sciences, are value-laden. Thus, decisions in social organizations are made by selecting a set of values and then choosing a course of action consistent with those values. In the final analysis, whether or not we should have a voucher system depends purely on the values we choose to promote.

[49]In other words, a higher progressive tax structure without a second "tax" in the forms of high- or full-cost tuition. Economists prefer to call this second tax a user charge. I doubt that those who pay it care what name it is given.

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G. Lester Anderson, Director of the Center for the Study of Higher Education and Professor of Higher Education, earned a Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota, where he also became a full professor. Having served in successive roles as Dean of Teacher Education, Dean of Administration, Vice-Chancellor, Vice President for Educational Affairs, and Distinguished Service Professor of Higher Education, Dr. Anderson has long been interested in governance and administrative matters. He is currently Acting Dean of The College of Education at The Pennsylvanis State University while they undergo an internal evaluation of the college.

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